Department of Political
Science
School
of Social Sciences
Faculty of Arts
Australian
National University
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CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY (POLS2063)
Second Semester, 2001
GO TO David West's Home Page .
Political theory has been revived, in recent years, by a series of ambitious and systematic works. This unit will examine such influential figures as Rawls, Nozick, Walzer, Oakeshott and Okin, who have in different ways renewed the diverse ideological traditions they represent. We shall examine their accounts of basic political values, their visions of the 'good society' - such questions as the nature of social justice and the distribution of wealth, central concepts such as equality, liberty and rights. Communitarian, socialist and feminist critiques of liberal political theory will be examined as well as green political theory and the relationship between political theory and practice. The aim of this unit is to develop critical, discussion and argumentative skills, and familiarity with key concepts and thinkers in contemporary political theory/ philosophy.
Second Semester.
Two lectures and one tutorial per week for eleven weeks (no tutorial
in first week).
Lecturer: Dr. David West.
Proposed assessment
One 2,500 word essay and a take-home assignment contributing 50% and
40% to the final mark respectively. In addition 10% of the final
mark will be given for tutorial attendance and contribution. Students
must attend at least 7 out of 10 tutorials in order to be eligible for
the final examination.
Return to Contents.
| Lecture Times | Mon 11.00 | Moran G007 |
| Tues 11.00 | Moran G007 |
A brief outline of each week’s topic will be handed out at the lectures and will be available at the website for this course. The handout provides only a brief outline of each week’s lectures and is not a substitute for attendance at lectures or your own notes.
Week One (w/b 16 July)
Introduction and Overview of the Course.
What is Political Theory? Between facts and values.
Week Two (w/b 23 July)
Conservatism: Michael Oakeshott against rationalism in politics.
Week Three (w/b 30 July)
Global Justice: From utilitarianism to human rights.
Week Four (w/b 6 August)
Nozick, Natural Rights and the Minimal State: Part I.
Week Five (w/b 13 August)
Nozick, Natural Rights and the Minimal State: Part II.
John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, Part I.
Week Six (w/b 20 August)
John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, Part II.
Week Seven (w/b 27 August
Susan Okin: A feminist critique of Rawls.
Week Eight (w/b 3 September)
Reading Week: No lectures or tutorials.
Week Nine (w/b 10 September)
Reading Week: No lectures or tutorials.
MID-SEMESTER BREAK: 15 SEPTEMBER TO 1 OCTOBER
ESSAY DEADLINE: THURSDAY 27 SEPTEMBER AT 4 PM
Week Ten (w/b 1 October)
1 October: No lecture (public holiday)
Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice: Pluralism and community:
Part I.
Week Eleven (w/b 8 October)
Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice: Pluralism and community:
Part II.
Alternative Conceptions of Freedom: Freedom, equality and culture:
Part I.
Week Twelve (w/b 15 October)
Alternative Conceptions of Freedom: Freedom, equality and culture:
Part II.
Green Political Theory: Nature as a political value: Part
I.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT AVAILABLE: FRIDAY 19 OCTOBER
Week Thirteen (w/b 22 October)
Green Political Theory: Nature as a political value: Part
II.
Conclusion and Overview.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT DUE: MONDAY 29 OCTOBER
Return to Contents.
TUTORIAL PROGRAMME
Tutorials will be held from the second week of Semester. Tutorial groups and times will be arranged at the first lecture. Tutorials are designed to give you an opportunity to discuss ideas raised in the lectures and to ask any questions you might have. They are an essential part of the course, and part of the final assessment will be based on tutorial attendance and a (non-assessed) short presentation. Students must attend at least 7 (out of 10) tutorials in order to be eligible for the final examination.
Essential readings for each tutorial are either contained in the
reading brick for Contemporary Political Theory, Parts I and II (marked
‘*’ below) or can be found in the main text for this unit, Will Kymlicka,
Contemporary Political Philosophy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) (marked
‘(*)’ below) available from the bookshop. Tutorial questions refer
either to essential readings or to material discussed in lectures.
These questions are intended to stimulate discussion but not to limit it
in any way.
Week One (w/b 16 July)
No tutorial. Reading Brick available from School of Social Sciences
Office.
Week Two (w/b 23 July)
Introduction and Overview. What is Political Theory?
1. An opportunity to discuss the unit as a whole, assessment,
any questions.
2. How easy is it to distinguish between (political) facts and
values? 2. What political ideas and values influence politics
in Australia today?
(*)Kymlicka, W.: Contemporary Political Philosophy, Introduction.
Okin, S. M.: Justice, Gender, and the Family, Ch. 1.
Barry, Norman P.: An Introduction to Modern Political Theory,
3rd ed., Introduction, pp. 3-15.
MacCallum, Gerald C.: Political Philosophy, Introduction, pp.
1-5.
Week Three (w/b 30 July)
Conservatism: Michael Oakeshott against rationalism in politics.
1. What does Oakeshott mean by ‘rationalism in politics’?
What does he see as its dangers? 2. What does Oakeshott see
as the role of tradition? Does the commitment to tradition imply
conservatism? 3. Is radical politics dangerous?
*Oakeshott, M. (1962): ‘Rationalism in politics’ in Rationalism
in Politics, (Methuen, London), pp. 1-36.
*Greenleaf, W. H.: M. Oakeshott’s Philosophical Politics, Ch.
4, III-IV, pp. 46-57.
Oakeshott, M. (1962): ‘On being conservative’ in Rationalism
in Politics.
Barry, N. P.: The New Right, Ch. 4.
Franco, P.: The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott, Ch.
4.
Week Four (w/b 6 August)
Global Justice: From utilitarianism to human rights.
1. Do we have a duty to help people in other countries?
What priority do their needs have compared to those of Australians?
2. What is utilitarianism? Are there any problems with utilitarianism?
3. How should Australia treat refugees?
*Jones, C. (1999): Global Justice: Defending cosmopolitanism,
Ch. 2 ‘Utilitarianism and Global Justice’, pp. 23-49.
*Singer, P.: Practical Ethics, Ch. 8 ‘Rich and Poor’, pp. 158-81.
Goodin, R. E. (1985): Protecting the Vulnerable: A reanalysis
of our social responsibilities (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago).
Williams, B. & Smart, J.J.C.: Utilitarianism: For and
against.
Week Five (w/b 13 August)
Nozick, Natural Rights and the Minimal State.
1. What, according to Nozick, are natural rights? What
natural rights does he think we have? 2. What is the ‘minimal
state’? Why does Nozick reject the more-than-minimal state?
3. What are the main policies of the neo-liberal ‘new right’ today?
*Pettit, P.: Judging Justice, Chs. 8-10, pp. 75-103.
(*)Kymlicka, W.: Contemporary Political Philosophy, Ch. 4.
Nozick, R.: Anarchy, State, and Utopia, esp. Parts I-II.
Okin, S. M.: Justice, Gender, and the Family, Ch. 4.
Brown, A. Modern Political Philosophy, Ch. 4.
Week Six (w/b 20 August)
John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, Part I.
1. Why does Rawls reject utilitarianism and majoritarianism?
2. What is a ‘contract theory’ of justice? 3. What is
the ‘original position’? What role does it play in Rawls’s argument?
4. Is Australia a just society?
*Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice, Ch. 1, Sections 1-4, pp. 3-33.
*Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P.: Rawls: A theory of justice
and its critics, Chs. 1-2, pp. 1-35.
(*)Kymlicka, W.: Contemporary Political Philosophy, Ch. 2.
Brown, A.: Modern Political Philosophy, Ch. 3.
Week Seven (w/b 27 August)
John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, Part II.
1. What are Rawls’s two principles justice? 2. Why
do some critics regard Rawls as too egalitarian? Why do some critics
think he is not egalitarian enough? 3. Would Rawls’s ‘difference
principle’ make Australia more or less equal?
*Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice, Ch. 1, 5-9, pp. 22-53.
*Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P.: Rawls: A theory of justice
and its critics, Chs. 3-4, pp. 37-73.
(*)Kymlicka, W.: Contemporary Political Philosophy, Ch. 3.
Mulhall, Stephen and Swift, Adam, Liberals and Communitarians, Introduction.
Week Eight (w/b 3 September)
Reading Week: No lectures or tutorials.
Week Nine (w/b 10 September)
Reading Week: No lectures or tutorials.
MID-SEMESTER BREAK: 15 SEPTEMBER TO 1 OCTOBER
ESSAY DEADLINE: THURSDAY 27 SEPTEMBER AT 4 PM
Week Ten (w/b 1 October)
Susan Okin: A feminist critique of Rawls.
1. What aspects of Rawls’s theory of justice does Okin criticise?
2. How does Okin propose to revise Rawls’s theory of justice in order
to take account of gender and the family? 3. Would Okin’s revisions
guarantee justice for women? If not, what else is needed?
*Okin, S M.: Justice, Gender, and the Family, Ch. 5, pp. 89-109.
*Nussbaum, M.: ‘Justice for women!’, Review of Justice, Gender,
and the Family in New York Review of Books, Oct. 8, 1992, pp. 43-8.
Okin, S. M.: ‘Reason and feeling in thinking about justice’ in
Ethics 99, January 1989.
Sunstein, C. R., ed.: Feminism and Political Theory (various
articles).
Week Eleven (w/b 8 October)
Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice: Pluralism and communities.
1. Is justice always the same wherever you are? 2.
What does Walzer mean by ‘dominance’ and ‘monopoly’? What is the
difference between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ equality? 3. What
would it take to bring about complex equality in Australia?
*Walzer, M.: Spheres of Justice, pp. 3-30, 46-48 & 312-21.
*Mulhall, Stephen & Swift, Adam, Liberals and Communitarians (Blackwell,
Oxford, 1992), Ch. 4, pp. 127-56.
Okin, S. M.: Justice, Gender, and the Family, Ch. 6.
Kymlicka, W.: Liberalism, Community and Culture, Ch. 11.
Shapiro, I.: Political Criticism, Ch. 3.
Said, Edward W.: ‘Michael Walzer’s Exodus and Revolution:
A Canaanite Reading’ in E. W. Said and C. Hitchens, eds Blaming the Victims,
pp. 161-78.
Week Twelve (w/b 15 October)
Alternative Conceptions of Freedom: Freedom, equality and culture.
1. What is negative freedom? What is effective freedom?
What is positive freedom? (Lectures) 2. Are effective freedom
and positive freedom dangerous? 3. Is Australia a free society?
*Berlin, I.: ‘Two concepts of liberty’ in I. Berlin, Four Essays
on Liberty, pp. 118-72.
*Norman, R.: ‘Does equality destroy liberty?’ in K. Graham, ed.
Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 83-109.
West, D.: ‘Beyond Social Justice and Social Democracy:
Positive freedom and cultural rights’ in D. Boucher and P. Kelly, eds Social
Justice: From Hume to Walzer (Routledge, London and New York, 1998),
pp. 232-252.
Taylor, C.: ‘What’s wrong with negative liberty?’ in Philosophical
Papers, Vol. 2.
McCallum, G.: ‘Negative and positive freedom’, Phil. Review,
July 1967.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT AVAILABLE: FRIDAY 19 OCTOBER
Week Thirteen (w/b 22 October)
Green Political Theory: Nature as a political value.
1. What is the difference between shallow (anthropocentric) and
deep (ecocentric) ecology? 2. What are the implications of
recognising the value of nature? 3. Are animals and nature
valued in Australia today?
*Vincent, A.: ‘Ecologism’ in Modern Political Ideologies, 2nd
ed. (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995), pp. 208-237 & 310-17.
*Eckersley, R.: ‘Just natural relations? Recent developments
in environmental political theory.’ Political Theory Newsletter, 5/2, Sept.
1993, pp. 110-125.
Ball, T. & Dagger, R.: Political Ideologies and the Democratic
Ideal, Ch. 9.
Dobson, A.: Green Political Thought, esp. Introduction and Chapter
1.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT DUE: MONDAY 29 OCTOBER
Return to Contents.
LECTURE OUTLINES
- 2001
Outlines will be posted here just before each week's lectures.
I. Introduction
1. Economic rationalism, as the currently prevailing ideology,
holds that:
(i) There are reliable, objective or ‘scientific’ principles
for maximising economic efficiency;
(ii) Principles of economic efficiency should be applied both
(a) within the economy or market sector, and (b) within as many other spheres
of society as possible.
(iii) Principles of economic efficiency take precedence over
all other values such as (equality, full employment, security of work,
academic excellence etc.).
2. Appeal of economic rationalism rests on (a) its apparently
objective or scientific character, and (b) the electoral importance of
economic issues.
3. Claim to scientific status promises the ‘end of ideology’,
avoidance of disputes of values, redundancy of moral and political philosophy.
4. But economic rationalism implicitly rests on questionable
moral or ‘normative’ assumptions:
(i) Happiness is the only human value;
(ii) Happiness is equivalent to utility;
(ii) Utility increases in proportion to economic wealth;
(iii) Wealth produces greater utility when it is spent privately
rather than publicly.
II. Positivism and Political Theory
1. Economic rationalism is reinforced by ‘positivism’.
2. Positivism implies the ideal of ‘value-free’ or ‘value-neutral’
political and social science.
3. ‘Positivist’ approach suggests that distinction between political
science and political theory corresponds to the distinction between facts
and values.
4. Subjectivism about values undermines discussion about values,
which is central to normative political theory.
5. Result reinforces the normative basis of economic rationalism.
III. But Values affect Political Science
1. Bias can distort any ‘objective’ scientific investigation.
2. Values influence the selection of facts as interesting or
worth studying.
3. Different theories imply different possible ‘dimensions of
variation’ for a society (C. Taylor).
IV. Political Facts also Influence Values
1. But ‘ought’ implies ‘can’: i.e. you have a moral duty
to do only what is possible.
2. So political theory can only propose values that are realisable.
3. So different theories in political science, which imply that
only certain kinds of society are possible, have conflicting implications
for political values as well.
V. Case Study: Susan Okin on Justice and Gender (Tutorial Reading)
1. Okin’s Justice, Gender and the Family as a work of contemporary
political theory which combines factual and value questions in an interesting
way.
2. Biological claims: e.g. that differences of ‘gender’
between men and women are not based on biological differences of ‘sex’.
3. Sociological and psychological claims: existing inequalities
between sexes; differences between families implied by differences
within families; social and psychological conditions for development
of a ‘sense of justice’.
4. Moral claim that all human beings have equal rights irrespective
of gender.
5. Claims of political theory: that certain changes to
law, politics or society will lead to greater fulfilment of these moral
values in societies like ours, with people like us.
2. Conservatism: Michael Oakeshott against Rationalism in Politics
I. Introduction
1. The Enlightenment project of a rational political philosophy/
rational society free of dogma, superstition, tradition.
2. One problem with this project is the possibility that it might
be unrealisable or ‘utopian’.
3. A second problem is that utopian thought may ultimately be
authoritarian and/or dangerous.
4. Oakeshott’s attack on ‘rationalism in politics’ - the attempt
to improve society through the application of reason - is related to both
of these problems.
II. The Hegelian Background
1. The Enlightenment project of extending the scope of scientific
rationality: rejection of religion and authority; application
of reason to understanding of humanity and construction of society.
2. The G.W.F. Hegel’s (1770-1831) critique of Enlightenment:
Kantian universal ‘morality’ (Moralität) vs. the concrete ‘ethical
life’ (Sittlichkeit) of a community.
3. The French Revolutionary Terror as the result of imposing
abstract rationality on a society.
4. Compare Edmund Burke (1729-97), Reflections on the Revolution
in France: value of sacred tradition.
III. Oakeshott’s on Practical and Technical Knowledge
1. Aristotle’s distinction between ‘practical’ and ‘technical’
knowledge.
2. Technical knowledge (Gk. techne) as ‘book learning’ championed
by Enlightenment: e.g. science.
3. Practical knowledge or judgment (Gk. phronesis) from involvement
in practices and traditions: e.g. moral judgment; artistic
activity; cooking without cookbooks.
4. Both practical and technical knowledge are involved in every
human activity.
IV. Rationalism in Politics
1. Rationalism in politics as denial of practical knowledge for
the sake of technical knowledge.
2. Aspects of political rationalism: ideology or ‘the plan’;
authoritarian practice; ‘upstart classes’; the ‘politics of
perfection’ and the ‘politics of passion’; tradition as ‘encumbrance’.
3. Oakeshott’s anti-rationalist view of politics: tradition
as ‘a concrete, coherent manner of living in all its intricacy’;
political education as ‘apprenticeship’; change as the working out
of ‘incoherencies in the arrangements of society’.
V. From Anti-Rationalist Philosophy to Conservative Ideology?
1. Oakeshott’s conservatism and the British tradition: constitutional
monarchy and the Settlement of 1688; individualism of ‘civil association’;
Common Law.
2. Communitarian liberalism against economic rationalism and
‘doctrinaire liberalism’ (e.g. F. Hayek).
3. Problem of identifying the tradition.
4. Possibility of a radical anti-rationalism? Compare the
Frankfurt School’s understanding of Marxist critical theory as an ‘internal’
or ‘immanent’ critique of society.
5. Oakeshott’s conservatism as philosophical scepticism or elitist
prejudice? Can scepticism be detached from prejudice?
3. Global Justice: From Utilitarianism to Global Human Rights
I. Introduction
1. Utilitarianism as an attempt to formulate a rational morality
independent of cultural and, especially, religious assumptions and traditions.
2. Major historical figures: Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John
Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900).
3. Utilitarianism is interesting because of influence on Australian
political history and culture.
II. Utilitarianism as Hedonist Consequentialism
1. Value of pleasure or satisfaction as self-evident principle
of rational morality.
2. Prudence or enlightened self-interest of overall pleasure
over course of a life.
3. D. Hume’s (1711-76) view of justice as usefulness to society.
4. The ‘impartial spectator’ and the ‘objective point of view’
of morality.
5. Priority of consequentialism of ‘the good’ over deontology
of ‘the right’.
6. Radical implications of utilitarianism: homosexuality,
suicide, euthanasia.
7. Utilitarianism against rights, against moral intuitions;
act- vs. rule-utilitarianism.
III. Utilitarianism: Criticisms, Developments and Variants
1. Conservative criticisms of debasing ‘morality’ and ‘swinish
pleasures’.
2. J. S. Mill on quality of ‘higher’ pleasures against quantity
of ‘lower’ pleasures.
3. Conflicting interpretations of utility: pleasure, satisfaction,
happiness, good life, preference satisfaction.
4. Problem of calculating utility: over a life; comparing
individuals.
5. Economic interpretation of utility: wealth as a ‘primary
good’.
IV. Implications of Utilitarianism: Towards a Global View of Justice
1. Utilitarianism and the collective or democratic strand of liberal
democracy.
2. Neglecting the ‘distinctness of persons’ and individual rights
(Nozick, Rawls).
3. Utilitarianism and indifference to distribution of wealth
or utility: efficiency as criterion; diminishing marginal utility
as argument for equality.
4. Act of omission and commission: the infinite scope of
utilitarian responsibility.
5. Peter Singer on consideration for ‘all sentient beings’;
value of animals vs. infants.
6. Justice without borders: justice not limited by national
borders.
7. Overall, utilitarianism as demanding moral doctrine incompatible
with individual projects, lives?
V. Global Justice and Human Rights
1. . C. Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism
distributive justice is best conceived in terms of human rights, from which it follows both that nation-state borders lack any fundamental ethical standing and that the demands of global justice include various positive actions aimed at protecting the vital interests of everyone, regardless of their location, nationality, or citizenship. (p. 2)2. ‘Cosmopolitan’ vs. ‘communitarian’ views of justice.
4. Nozick, Natural Rights and the Minimal State
I. Introduction
1. Nozick’s aims: (i) to justify the minimal state;
(ii) to show that nothing more extensive than the minimal state is justified.
2. Minimal state enforces internal law and order; defence
against external aggressors. As favoured state of libertarians and
new right/ neo-liberalism.
3. Nozick as radical (or reactionary?) in relation to contemporary
western societies.
II. Nozick on Natural Rights
1. Assumption of individual natural rights prior to society, law
and institutions.
2. Rights as absolute ‘side constraints’ or the priority of ‘right’
over ‘good’ and attack on consequentialism (e.g. utilitarianism);
against consequentialism of rights as well.
3. Justification for rights: individuals as ‘ends and never
merely means’ (Kant); separateness of persons and non-existence of
‘social entity’ justifying redistribution; neutrality of state.
4. Nozick’s Lockean list of rights as ‘possessive individualism’
(Macpherson); central role of private property rights.
5. Nozick’s rights as negative rather than positive rights, bec.
redistribution violates rights.
6. Indifference to political rights; Nozick on ‘demoktesis’
and democracy.
7. Rights ‘foundational’ rather than ‘derivative’; absolute
rather than conditional.
III. The ‘Invisible Hand’ Justification of the State
1. Starting point designed to convince even the anarchist, who
believes no state is justified. Therefore, a strong justification
of the state.
2. ‘Invisible hand’ of capitalist economy translating individual
self-interest into economic common good (Adam Smith).
3. Analogous transition from ‘state of nature’ to minimal state
without violating natural rights.
4. Comparison of Nozick with Hobbes: Nozick’s optimism
vs Hobbes’s pessimism about state of nature; ‘invisible hand’ vs
contract derivation of the state; minimal vs absolute state.
5. Nozick asserts p rimacy of morality over politics or
‘justice as legitimacy’: i.e. legitimacy of the state depends on
its compatibility with pre-existing natural rights.
IV. Derivation of the Minimal State
1. Locke’s account of the state of nature as ‘most favoured situation
of anarchy’ with rationally self-interested agents and only occasional
rights violations.
2. ‘Protection agencies’ as private police forces hired by individuals.
3. The emergence of a ‘dominant protection agency’ (DPA).
But DPA is not yet a state: no monopoly; no universal provision
of protection.
4. From the DPA to the minimal or ‘night-watchman’ state:
monopoly of jurisdiction and coercion; compensation; non-redistributive
provision for poor.
5. Remaining anarchist doubts about the minimal state?
V. Limiting the State
1. Negative natural rights do not require anything more than a
minimal state.
2. Redistribution violates natural rights, so more-than-minimal
redistributive state is illegitimate. But possibility of non-intentionally-redistributive
activities.
3. Redistribution presupposes a non-existent collective entity
(c.f. Hayek, Thatcher).
4. ‘End-state’ and ‘patterned’ principles of distribution illegitimate;
only temporarily effective, so must be continually reinforced by authoritarian
govt (Wilt Chamberlain).
5. Only ‘historical’ principles are legitimate: entitlement
theory of ownership - rights in acquisition, transfer and rectification.
But radical implications of rectification?
5. John Rawls’ Theory of Justice: Part I.
I. Introduction
1. Problem of grounding normative political philosophy;
positivism and subjectivism about values; philosophy as conceptual
analysis.
2. By contrast, Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971) as substantive,
systematic, substantial, influential.
3. Rawls’ overall position is compatible with welfare state liberal
capitalism, but also market socialism.
II. The Method: Reflective Equilibrium
1. The sceptical, analytical background: task of philosophy
as analysis or definition of concepts without substantive moral or political
implications.
2. Rawls’ aim to produce substantive moral theory. But
there are no self-evident moral principles or completely reliable intuitions
(c.f. utilitarianism).
3. Rawls’ method of ‘reflective equilibrium’ or long term balance
between considered intuitions and proposed general principles.
4. Problem with this ‘coherence’ view of moral truth: e.g.
possibility of consistent but obnoxious intuitions and principles.
But how else can we ground values?
III. Critique of Utilitarianism and Majoritarianism
1. Utilitarianism and majoritarianism (democratic principle) as
two dominant approaches to politics (until 1970s).
2. Problems with consequentialist ethics (utilitarianism):
innocent individual (c.f. Nozick); indifference to distribution (but
c.f. ‘diminishing marginal utility’); as a conception of the common
good, not justice.
3. ‘Impartial spectator’ approach to morality overcomes selfishness,
but ignores separateness of persons/ issues of justice.
4. Problems with majoritarianism: formal inconsistencies;
tyranny of the majority.
5. Rawls advocates priority of ‘right’ over ‘good’, or deontology
over consequentialism: pursuit of welfare and democracy constrained
by rights and justice.
6. But note that welfare/ common good is still an important part
of theory of justice.
IV. Contract Theory and the Original Position
1. Contract approach guarantees respect for the distinctness and
plurality of persons.
2. Principles derived from ‘pure’ (rather than ‘perfect’ or ‘imperfect’)
procedural justice.
3. The ‘original position’ as a hypothetical device or thought
experiment; its place in reflective equilibrium.
4. The parties to the original position: rationally self-interested,
mutually disinterested individuals with a plurality of values, living under
conditions of scarcity.
5. The ‘veil of ignorance’ excludes principles that favour certain
individuals/ fair.
6. Original position concerned with ‘primary goods’, or things
‘useful for any rational plan’ of life: as ‘thin’ theory of the good;
individualism; materialism?
V. Selecting the Two Principles of Justice
1. The parties to the original position decide as one. Is
it still a contract theory?
2. Pessimistic ‘maximin’ strategy to maximise the chances of
the worst-off.
3. Compare gambler’s strategy (max. average/ utilitarianism)
and optimistic ‘maximax’ strategy (max. chances of the best-off/ elitism).
4. Maximin as egalitarian in the sense that it requires ‘equality
for all unless inequalities work to the advantage of the worst-off’.
5. Grounds for the maximin strategy: ignorance of probabilities;
ensuring a reasonable minimum; cautious responsibility for future
generations.
6. But in comparing different societies, maximin strategy ignores
all but the worst-off.
6. John Rawls’ Theory of Justice - Part II.
I. General and Special Conceptions of Justice
1. Maximin strategy leads to general conception of justice that
‘all primary social goods be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution
would be to everyone’s advantage’ (Theory of Justice, p. 150).
2. The general conception allows unequal rights and liberties
as well as unequal wealth, if inequalities will lead to a greater allocation
of primary goods to the worst-off.
3. General conception is designed for economically less developed
societies: e.g. authoritarian conditions enhancing primary industrialisation.
II. The Priority of Liberty
1. The condition for the priority of liberty is a level of development
at which both the ‘free internal life’ of communities and political aspirations
(democracy) become more important than further material improvements.
2. C.f. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: moral and political
needs become more important once basic material needs are satisfied.
3. Argument for freedom of conscience from the original position.
4. Argument for equal citizenship and democracy as the basis
of self-respect.
5. The outcome of these arguments is the fully articulated special
conception of justice with the two principles of (I) equal liberty and
(II) difference principle:
I. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. II. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged... and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (p. 302)6. Lexical ordering (as opposed to weighting) of the two principles: i.e. there can be no trading of liberties for wealth once the special conception is in operation.
III. The Difference Principle
1. That, subject to the principle of equal liberty, socio-economic
inequalities will be arranged to the ultimate advantage of the worst-off
(see II, 5).
2. The egalitarian basis of the difference principle: society
as co-operative enterprise.
3. Alternative systems of distributive justice: ‘natural
liberty’ (c.f. Hayek and Nozick); ‘liberal equality’ (meritocracy);
‘democratic equality’ (Rawls).
4. Criticisms from the right: Nozick’s view that Rawlsian
distribution violates natural rights of ownership over (benefits from)
social and natural assets.
5. Criticism from the left: relative poverty and self-respect;
against ‘socialism as envy’.
IV Concluding Remarks
1. Does Rawls’s theory of justice amount to a conservative defence
or radical critique of ‘actually existing’ liberal capitalism?
2. Compatibility of Rawls’ theory of justice with market socialism:
market with social ownership of means of production.
3. Application of the theory depends on its empirical assumptions:
role of incentives; optimum degree of inequality; ‘chain-connectedness’
and ‘close-knitness’ of expectations.
4. Does the difference principle embody a commitment to fraternity.
7.
Susan Okin: A Feminist Critique of Rawls.
‘To a large extent, contemporary theories of justice, like those of the past, are about men with wives at home’. (Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, p. 13)
I. Introduction: Comparison of Socialist and Feminist
Critiques
1. Socialist critique of the abstraction of liberal political
thought from economy or sphere of production: public/ private dichotomy
(I).
2. Feminist critique of the abstraction of liberal thought from
the family or sphere of reproduction: public/ private dichotomy (II).
3. Possible extension of liberal principles to economy:
positive rights, workplace democracy, economic justice.
4. Possible extension of liberal principles to sphere of reproduction:
justice within the family, gender equality etc. Is that enough to
answer feminist criticisms?
II. The Patriarchal Origins of Liberal Thought
1. Patriarchal assumptions of classic liberal theorists:
Locke, Rousseau and Hobbes.
2. Pateman’s Sexual Contract: 17-18th century contract
theories seen as part of a rebellion against traditional patriarchy or
‘rule of the father’.
3. But the social contract was accompanied by a hidden ‘fraternal
contract’, which reinforced the subordination of women by instituting modern
patriarchy as ‘rule of the brothers’ (not rule of the father).
4. What are the implications of Pateman’s historical critique
of contract theory for contemporary liberals such as Rawls’?
III. Gender in Rawls’ Theory of Justice
1. Rawls’ failure to address the issue of the gender of ‘heads
of families’ and sex in the veil of ignorance.
2. Representative heads of family are supposed to be concerned
for future generations.
3. But this representative device excludes consideration of relations
within the family (of gender or between generations), which become ‘opaque
to claims of justice’.
4. Okin’s arguments for treatment of the family as a topic of
justice:
(i) Family and gender relations are not natural or biologically
given.
(ii) Intrafamilial relationships have important effects on interfamilial
inequalities, which Rawls does regard as the concern of a theory of justice.
(iii) Families are not beyond justice (c.f. Sandel). Justice
is an essential, even if not necessarily the highest, virtue of family
life (Kymlicka).
(iv) Family as ‘the earliest school of moral development’.
Therefore families must be just, if they are not to be ‘schools of despotism’
(J. S. Mill).
(v) Families are important contexts for the development of ‘empathy
and a readiness to listen’, necessary for effective participation in the
original position.
IV. Okin’s ‘Humanist Conception of Justice’
1. Okin’s feminist revision of Rawls’ theory: (a) sex covered
by veil of ignorance; (b) institution of the family included as topic of
justice in the original position.
2. Implications for currently gendered organisation of society:
elimination and/or depoliticisation of gender; some concrete proposals.
3. Is the elimination of gender practicable or desirable (Nussbaum)?
4. Okin takes for granted the Western (heterosexual monogamous)
nuclear family.
5. Nussbaum’s ‘thicker’ theory of the good: justice as
‘equality of capabilities’ (power) rather than resources (primary goods).
10. Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice: Pluralism and Community.
I. Walzer’s Approach to Justice
1. Walzer’s anti-authoritarian communitarianism for pluralism
and ‘complex equality’.
2. Contextualist conception of justice:
Justice is relative to social meanings... A given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way - that is, faithful to the shared understandings of its members (SJ, pp. 312-3).3. No universal or transcendental theory of justice, valid for all societies, is possible.
II. Spheres of Justice
1. ‘Spheres of justice’: diversity of social goods and criteria
of distribution.
2. Within a culture justice means recognising the distinctive
claims of different spheres of justice; ‘tyranny’ is the overriding
of such claims.
3. ‘Dominant’ goods are goods whose possession implies command
over a wide range of other goods belonging to different spheres.
4. Example: the dominance of money in commercial society;
Marx in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.
5. Preliminary discussion of particular spheres of justice
and various principles of distribution: money; goods and commodities;
jobs & offices; health; education; love and affection.
III. Simple and Complex Equality or Monopoly vs Dominance
1. ‘Monopoly’ as ‘the holding of dominant goods against rivals’
(p. 11).
2. Ideal of ‘simple equality’ as elimination of monopoly (e.g.
equality of wealth).
3. But simple equality leaves dominance unchallenged, though
reduces its extent.
4. Simple equality may lead to problems associated with socialism:
intrusive state; dominance of political power and office.
5. ‘Complex equality’ as the elimination of dominance:
distribution within each sphere according to its own criteria; compensating
inequalities in other spheres.
6. Walzer’s criticisms of both liberalism and socialism:
neglect of dominance of money by liberalism; neglect of dominance
of power and office by socialism.
7. Distinctive defence of welfare as what is required to ‘sustain
and enhance a common culture’ (p. 74). E.g. mediaeval Judaism;
Ancient Athens etc.
IV. Community and Membership
1. Communities have the right to choose their members: ‘the
distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without
it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life’ (p. 39).
As racism or chauvinism?
2. Right of exclusion qualified by duty to aid needy ‘strangers’.
3. White Australia: ‘White Australia could survive only
as Little Australia’. (p. 47)
4. Communities must also be ‘politically inclusive’: i.e.
all inhabitants must have the rights of citizenship ? no ‘metics’ (Ancient
Athens) or ‘guest workers’ accorded second-class citizenship:
The theory of distribute justice begins, then, with an account of membership rights. It must vindicate at one and the same time the (limited) right of closure, without which there could be no communities at all, and the political inclusiveness of the existing communities. For it is only as members somewhere that men and women can hope to share in all the other social goods ? security, wealth, honor, office, and power ? that communal life makes possible. (p. 63)11. Alternative Conceptions of Freedom.
I. Introduction
1. Communitarian criticism that liberal individualism weakens
relationship of individual to community and its goals.
2. Liberal freedom is also negative rather than positive in two
senses: (i) formal rather than effective freedom; (ii) assumes
given wants rather than real or authentic interests.
II. Formal vs. Effective Liberty
1. Liberalism and the ‘bourgeoisie’: the self-sufficient
individual; freedom as being left alone.
2. Liberalism concerned with negative rather than positive rights;
resources.
3. Rawls’s two principles of justice: commitment to equal
formal liberty, but unequal effective liberty or ‘worth of liberty’ (Daniels)
acc. difference principle.
4. The worse off in the ‘just’ society may:
(i) have freedoms worth much less than those of others;
(ii) exert less influence through the democratic process (politics
of support) and over the society governed by that process (politics of
power) (A. Gamble);
(iii) suffer domination through illegal distortions of the democratic
process (e.g. corruption).
III. Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty
1. Rawls’s distinction between formal liberty and ‘worth of liberty’
or effective liberty.
2. Failure of distinction according to N. Daniels: arguments
from the original position and from respect.
3. Worth of liberty is not a ‘monotonic function’ of index of
primary goods, because relative rather than absolute wealth may determine
worth of liberty (e.g. democracy).
4. Egalitarian implications of the original position on Daniels’
interpretation. C.f. Okin’s internal critique of Rawls.
IV. Positive Freedom and the Authenticity of Wants
1. Positive freedom and ‘authenticity’ of wants: ideology,
culture, manipulation.
2. Individualist view of individuals, as fully-formed and pre-social,
ignores formation and possible deformation of individuals (and their wants)
within society .
3. Rawls’s blindness to ideology: patriarchy; children;
market capitalism.
4. Liberals identify dangers with positive conceptions of freedom
as the ‘fulfilment of real interests’ (see I. Berlin ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’),
esp. paternalism (forcing people to be free).
5. Berlin’s description of ‘independent momentum’ from positive
freedom to tyranny.
6. The ‘paradox of enlightenment’ for critics of society whose
values are predominantly libertarian and democratic:
… if they are to remain true to their political values they may implement no changes without the consent of those who are affected by them, and if they seek to implement no such changes, then they acquiesce in the persistence of a social system radically at odds with their political values. (Ted Benton)7. An acceptable concept of positive freedom need not have the authoritarian implications of organic, collective and reified views of the self opposed by Berlin.
12 Green Political Theory: Nature as a Political Value
I. Introduction
1. Contemporary importance of ‘green’ and ‘ecological’ politics
only recently reflected in political theory. Similar situation in
relation to gender (c.f. Okin on Rawls).
2. Distinctive questions of green theory: consideration
of relationship between human beings and non-human nature/ animals rather
than relationships among human beings.
II. Historical Stages in the Relationship between Humanity and Nature
1. Earliest stage of vulnerability to nature. Animism and
worship of nature.
2. Stage of increasing control over nature: agriculture;
basic technology. Nature as an hierarchical order with humanity (or
God) at the top.
3. Modern and post-Enlightenment period: accelerating development
of natural science, technology and production. Dualism (Descartes)
views nature including animals as purely mechanical system to be ruthlessly
exploited by human beings.
4. Current ecological crisis: limits to growth; renewed
vulnerability of humanity to nature; systemic and global effects
on nature.
5. Paradoxically, human beings become objects rather than subjects
of productive process.
III. Shallow vs. Deep Ecology
1. Green political thought reformulates nature/ humanity relationship:
shallow and deep variants.
2. Deep ecology (ecocentrism) accords intrinsic value to nature
(animals, species).
3. Some issues for deep ecology: extension of moral value;
conflicts of interest between species; species vs. individuals;
spiritual vs. secular basis.
4. Difficulty of grounding deep ecology in secular post-Enlightenment
rationalism: Kant on moral subjects and objects; natural rights;
utilitarianism.
5. Shallow ecology as enlightened anthropocentrism/ humanism:
long-term and unintended consequences; aesthetic qualities of nature;
intergenerational justice.
6. Comparison of deep and shallow ecology: instrumentalism;
animals; ecocentrism as a pragmatic commitment.
IV. Green Thought and its Relationship to Other Political Ideologies
1. How does green ideology relate to other issues and ideologies?
2. Politics of contemporary ‘greens’ includes wide range of issues
not directly related to nature: feminism; minority rights;
international justice; peace; participatory democracy.
3. Theoretical independence of attitude to nature and to relationships
between human beings.
4. Relationship between green ideology and other ideologies:
fascism; conservatism; socialism and Marxism; feminism;
liberalism.
V. Environmentalism vs. Ecology
1. Dobson’s distinction (Green Political Thought, Routledge, 1990).
2. Environmentalism ‘seeks a cleaner service economy, sustained
by cleaner technology and producing cleaner affluence’ (p. 9).
3. Ecology/ Greens ‘desire to restructure the whole of political,
social and economic life’ (p. 3).
4. The radical ecological programme combines the issues of green
politics to challenge the ‘dominant paradigm’ of industrial society.
Return to Contents.
SUPPLEMENTARY LECTURE
OUTLINES
I. Introduction
1. Last lecture: facts depend on values, so political science depends
on political theory.
2. But values also depend on facts, because political values must
be realisable.
3. So what is it for a set of political values to be realisable?
Political goals must lie somewhere between the impossible and the actual
- or between utopianism and conformism.
II. The Problem of Agency
1. Political problems are social and therefore involve the intentions
and actions of other people.
2. Some examples: poverty & unemployment; feminism and personal
politics; crime; illiteracy (P. Freire).
3. The ‘problem of agency’: how to achieve the cooperation, acquiescence
or defeat of other people in order to achieve a political goal.
4. But even good intentions are insufficient: the fate of New Year’s
resolutions:
‘The road to hell is paved with good intentions’
5. Insufficiency of good intentions in social contexts: for example,
utopian communities and shared houses; welfare state vs market economics.
III. Utopian Political Thought
1. Time and political goals: from the immediately realisable through
the long-term goal and the infinite ideal (‘Aim high’) to the impossible
(‘A society for angels’).
2. More’s Utopia from ‘outopia’ (Gk: nowhere) and ‘eutopia’ (Gk: a
good place): archetype of the unattainable political ideal.
3. Compare examples of non-utopian political thought: written for
a collective agent with the desire/ will and the power to realise a particular
goal (Machiavelli’s Prince; Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and the rise
of the ‘middling classes’).
4. Marx and Engels’s critique of ‘utopian socialism’ (see Engels reading):
agency of revolutionary class; inevitable (?) development of capitalism.
5. Marx and Engels’s ‘scientific socialism’: capitalism as its own
grave digger; creation of a large, unified, homogenised, self-conscious
working class with an interest in socialist revolution.
IV. The Value of Utopian Thought
1. Still, utopian thought may be useful: as disguised critique; as
imaginative anticipation or exploration of alternative societies or forms
of life; as persuasion (see Kumar & Lukes).
2. Politics as an existential attitude:
2. Hayek
- A Programme for the New Right
I. Introduction
1. Hayek’s view of libertarianism as a sceptical, ‘humble’ ideology
apparently in conflict with the ambitious scope of his ‘new right’ programme.
2. Hayek’s social theory as response to Marxism and other threats
to liberty.
II. Sceptical Epistemology ? A Philosophical Attack on Revolution and Utopia
1. Popper’s falsificationism - no secure confirmation of theories;
only falsification.
2. Falsificationism supports ‘critical’ as opposed to ‘constructivist
rationalism’.
3. Critical rationalism implies ‘piecemeal’ or liberal vs. ‘utopian’
or totalitarian social engineering.
4. Compare Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism in politics. But Hayek
supports small-scale reformism and some kinds of rationalism; e.g. argument
for markets (see below).
III. The Social Distribution of Knowledge ? A Pragmatic Defence of Markets
1. Practical or tacit knowledge (c.f. Oakeshott) and the functioning
of societies.
2. But practical knowledge is inevitably distributed throughout society:
anti-elitism of Hayek as compared to Oakeshott.
3. Economic market as ‘cognitive mechanism’ for use of tacit economic
knowledge distributed throughout society.
4. Central economic planning inevitably counterproductive, because
it is based on inadequate (merely technical) knowledge.
IV. Spontaneous Orders and Social Evolution ? A Pragmatic Defence of Tradition
1. ‘Spontaneous order’ or ‘catallaxy’ (cosmos) vs. ‘planned’ or ‘designed
order’ (taxis): language and market as examples of spontaneous order.
2. Social institutions as learning mechanisms in competition; c.f.
natural selection.
3. Evolutionary theory of social change as learning occurs over time,
which implies the value of tradition as accumulated learning.
4. Therefore central planning is doubly inadequate, because it ignores
(synchronic) social distribution and (diachronic) historical accumulation
of knowledge.
5. Dilemma for Hayek: what happens when social evolution spontaneously
threatens ‘spontaneous’ orders such as the free market (as warned in The
Road to Serfdom)?
6. Conservative doubts: spontaneous disorder as possible outcome
of spontaneous change: e.g. emergence of welfare state/ road to serfdom.
V. Social Philosophy ? A Moral Defence of Markets and Freedom
1. Kantian universalist ethics: impartiality, rule of law and the
neutral state.
2. Freedom as the autonomous pursuit of happiness.
3. Implies formal as opposed to substantive law and negative freedom.
4. Free market favoured, because it allows the autonomous pursuit
of happiness. Collectivism and planning rejected, because they impose
substantive goals on society.
5. Rejection of political freedom and suspicion of democracy, because
they threaten (real) negative freedom: substantive goals beyond rule of
law; taxation; social justice.
VI. Against Social Justice - A Moral Attack on Egalitarianism
1. Distinguish egalitarian commitment to material equality from equality
of treatment.
2. Egalitarianism as illiberal, because it implies unequal treatment;
as collectivist imposition of goals on society.
3. Justice presupposes responsibility of human agents, so no such
thing as social justice, which is based on envy. Hayek’s rejection of
notion of ‘relative deprivation’.
4. The social benefits of inequality: inheritance, family, culture.
3.
Communitarianism: Individual and Community
I. Introduction
1. Historical background: centrality of religious and economic freedom
to emergence of liberalism.
2. Associated limitations of liberalism: (I) individualism; (II)
negative freedom.
3. To address (I) individualism: (a) communitarian critique and ‘politics
of the common good’ (this week); (b) Walzer’s ‘complex equality’ (week
10).
II. The Historical Background of Liberal Individualism
1. Individualism in religion: Protestantism and individual’s direct
relationship with God; individual salvation; democratic church government.
2. Individualism as the basis for religious toleration (at least of
other Protestants).
3. Individualism in economics: market relations; self-reliance;
destruction of communal structures of feudalism.
4. Rawls’s individualistic assumptions reflect these historical origins:
self-interest & mutual disinterest of parties to the original position.
III. The Communitarian Critique of the Abstract Individual
1. Abstract individual as a fiction: constitution of individual through
socialisation, language, social practices, ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit).
2. Social constitution undermines the neo-Kantian project of producing
a transcendental (universal and timeless) basis for moral and political
values. Cf Hegel, Oakeshott.
3. For communitarians moral judgment is understood not as choice but
as discovery in the context of the shared values of an historical community
(Sandel).
4. In fact, later Rawls of Political Liberalism adopts a more contextualist
approach to his theory of justice as appropriate to societies with a particular
history (Cf Section I).
IV. The Politics of the Common Good
1. Politics of the common good in contrast to neutral liberal state
of (a) utilitarianism (all preferences) (b) Rawls (only just preferences).
2. Politics of the common good does not give equal weight to preferences,
because only ‘good’ preferences deserve to be satisfied.
3. Strengths of politics of common good: stronger commitment to community
& welfare; firmer basis for legitimacy of political institutions;
response to alienation of modern societies reduces danger of less attractive
response (racism, nationalism).
4. Potential dangers of politics of common good: agreeing on the
common good; intolerant, authoritarian and/or exclusionary implications.
5. Historical communities and exclusion: Ancient Greece, 18C New
England.
6. Possibly conservative implications: pornography and homosexuality.
C.f. liberal support for privacy against ‘legal moralism’.
V. Between Individualism and Communitarianism
1. Common ground between communitarianism and liberalism (see Kymlicka).
2. Possibility of criticising any value, if not all the values, that
we inherit from our communities.
3. Importance, even for liberals, of creating and preserving the cultural
conditions of autonomous choice.
4. Emphasis on access to culture: concern for illiteracy, language.
5. Critical access to culture: critical cultural studies; risks
of commercialisation of culture.
6. Cultural rights of ethnic and indigenous communities.
Return to Contents.
Choose a title from the list below. If you would like to write an essay on a different topic, you should discuss it with me first. You can discuss any problems you are having with your essay during my consultation times (to be advised) or at other times by arrangement. Essays should be between 2,000-2,500 words in length. Make sure you indicate the number of words of your essay on the cover sheet. Longer essays may be penalised.
Guidelines on Essay Writing
Essays should be concise, clearly expressed, logically argued and coherently structured. Ideally, you should develop your own critical point of view or argument with reference to the existing literature on the topic. You should draw on a reasonably wide range of sources. Suitable readings can be found with the help of the reading lists in this guide and the resources of the library. Essays should have clear and complete references - any reasonable system of referencing is acceptable as long as it is consistently applied and includes full bibliographical information (i.e. author, title, date, journal or publisher, place, page numbers etc. where relevant). Essays should be produced on a word processor or typed. Use a spelling-checker to avoid unnecessary errors. If you need help with essay writing or are unsure about what is required for a good essay in political theory, you should consult the Department of Political Science’s Guidelines on Essay Writing and/or the Study Skills Centre (for details see below).
Suggested Essay Titles
1. In what sense is Oakeshott conservative?
2. Discuss Oakeshott’s criticisms of ‘rationalism in politics’?
3. Assess Nozick’s justification of the ‘minimal state’ and rejection
of anything more than a minimal state. Are Nozick’s arguments convincing?
4. How does Rawls argue for his theory of justice? Are
his arguments convincing?
5. Discuss Rawls’s two principles of justice. Do they amount
to an adequate theory of justice?
6. What are Okin’s criticisms of Rawls? Do Okin’s suggested
revisions of Rawls’s theory of justice answer feminist criticisms?
7. Is the family beyond justice? If not, what are the implications
of justice for the family?
8. Discuss Michael Walzer’s account of justice in Spheres of
Justice.
9. What is communitarianism? Does communitarianism offer
an attractive approach to politics?
10. Is freedom compatible with equality? Consider different
conceptions of freedom and equality.
11. What is the difference between conceptions of negative, effective
and positive freedom? Which conception of freedom is most convincing?
12. What is the value of nature?
13. Do animals have rights?
Return to Contents.
DEPARTMENTAL RULES ON ESSAY SUBMISSION, EXTENSIONS, PLAGIARISM AND PENALTIES
Submission of Essays
1. Once essays on a particular topic have been returned to students,
no further essays on that topic will be accepted.
2. All essays submitted by the due date will be assessed and
returned before the examination/ second assignment.
3. No essays will be accepted after the commencement of the examination/
second assignment in a course unless permission is secured on ‘medical
or other reasonable grounds’.
Extensions
Extensions may be granted on medical or other reasonable grounds.
Students seeking an extension should discuss their request with me before
the due date. Please let me know if you are experiencing any problems
that may affect your studies. Extensions may be granted on medical
or other reasonable grounds. Please note the following:
1. Medical reasons -requests for extensions should be supported
by a medical certificate.
2. Personal problems - if possible, requests for extensions
should be supported by a letter from the University Counselling Service,
doctor, college tutor or similar.
3. Clash of essay deadlines - extensions will not normally
be given where a clash of essay deadlines is known in advance.
4. Outside employment - extensions will not normally be
given where external work commitments are known in advance. Requests
for extensions should be supported by a letter from your employer.
5. Participation in sporting events - requests for extensions
should be supported by a letter from the appropriate sporting body.
Penalties
In fairness to students who meet the deadline, the Political Science Department imposes a penalty on all essays submitted after the due date or later than an approved extension of the due date. The penalty is one percentage point subtracted from the assessed mark for the essay, for each calendar day (or part thereof) by which the essay is overdue.
Plagiarism and Appeals
Your attention is also drawn to the School and Faculty Policies on Plagiarism
and Appeals.
Return to Contents.
The most useful single text for this unit is Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989). This book is available from the University Co-op Bookshop and you should buy it. It provides a useful background for many of the lectures and tutorials in the course. The following reading list covers the major areas of the unit and supplements suggested tutorial readings. You can also access and search an online bibliography at the website for this unit.
GST Rebate should apply to listed texts
for this course:
W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (OUP)
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP)
R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Blackwell)
M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Blackwell)
S. Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (Basic Books)
A. Brown, Modern Political Philosophy (Penguin)
A. Dobson, Green Political Thought (Hutchinson)
Some useful works covering broad areas of contemporary political theory
are:
N. P. Barry: An Introduction to Modern Political Theory (3rd
ed.)
Benn, S. & R. Peters: Social Principles and the Democratic
State
Alan Brown: Modern Political Philosophy
Heywood, Andrew : Political Ideas and Concepts: An introduction
(2nd ed., 1999).
MacCallum, G. C.: Political Philosophy.
Susan Okin: Justice, Gender, and the Family
Pettit, P.: Judging Justice
Phillips, D. L.: Toward a Just Social Order, esp. Part I.
Sargent, L. T.: Contemporary Political Ideologies: A comparative
analysis.
Sargent, L. T.: Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Reader.
Raphael, D. D. : Problems of Political Philosophy.
Vincent, A.: Modern Political Ideologies (2nd ed., 1995).
Political philosophers who have produced major or influential works
which are relevant to many aspects of the course:
John Rawls: A Theory of Justice (liberalism)
Robert Nozick: Anarchy, State and Utopia (libertarian)
Michael Walzer: Spheres of Justice (communitarian)
Peter Singer: Practical Ethics (utilitarian)
R. M. Dworkin: Taking Rights Seriously (liberalism, rights, law)
Michael Oakeshott: Rationalism in Politics (conservatism)
I. What is political philosophy?
Facts and values
Raphael, D. D.: Problems of Political Philosophy, Ch. 1.
Kymlicka, W.: Contemporary Political Philosophy, Introduction.
C. Taylor: 'Neutrality in political science' in A. Ryan (ed.)
The Philosophy of Social Explanation
A. MacIntyre: 'Ideology, social science and revolution' in Comparative
Politics, Vol. 3, 1973
A. MacIntyre: 'Is a science of comparative politics possible?'
in Ryan, op. cit.
Gunther & Reshauer: 'Science and values in political science'
in Phil. of Social Science, 1, 1971
J. Habermas: Theory and Practice, esp. Intro. & Chs. 1 &
6
Critical theory
R. Keat: The Politics of Social Theory
R.J. Bernstein: Restructuring Social and Political Theory
M. Jay: The Dialectical Imagination (a history of the Frankfurt
School)
D. Held: Introduction to Critical Theory
W. C. Gay & P. Eckstein: 'Bibliographical guide to hermeneutics
and critical theory', Cultural Hermeneutics 2, 1975
A. Wellmer: Critical Theory
H. Marcuse: Negations esp. 'Philosophy and critical theory'
Utopian thought
F. Engels: ‘Socialism: utopian and scientific' in, for example,
Essential Works of Marxism, ed. A. P. Mendel, Bantam, 1961
B. Goodwin: Social Science and Utopia, Harvester, 1978
Goodwin, B. & Taylor, K.: The Politics of Utopia (London,
Hutchinson, 1982).
Habermas J.: Theory and Practice, Introduction and Ch. 6.
Hudson, W: The Marxist Philosophy of Ernst Bloch, 1982.
K. Kumar: Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times
Kumar, K: Utopianism (Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press,
1991)
Lukes, S.: Marxism and Morality, pp. 36-47
Manuel, F. E. (ed.): Utopias and Utopian Thought (Boston &
Cambridge, 1966)
F. E. Manuel and F. P. Manuel: Utopian Thought in the Western
World.
Marcuse, H.: ‘Philosophy and critical theory’ in Negations.
J. Passmore: The Perfectibility of Man
K. Popper: The Poverty of Historicism
II. The New Right
The 'conservative' strand
Barry, B.: Political Argument, pp. 54-8.
R. Scruton: The Meaning of Conservatism
A. Ryan: Article on Scruton in G. A. Cohen, et. al., The New
Right
M. Oakeshott: Rationalism in Politics, esp. 'Political education'
and ‘Rationalism in politics’
W. H. Greenleaf: The Philosophical Politics of M. Oakeshott
B. Crick: 'The world of Michael Oakeshott', Encounter, 20, 1963
C. Falck: 'Romanticism in politics', New Left Review, 1963
Franco, P.: The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott.
D. D. Raphael: 'Professor Oakeshott's Rationalism in Politics'
in Political Studies, 12, 1964
The 'libertarian' strand
F. A. Hayek: 'Equality, value and merit' in M. Sandel, ed. Liberalism
and its Critics
F. A. Hayek: The Constitution of Liberty
F. A. Hayek: Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics
F. A. Hayek: New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and
the History of Ideas
Kukathas, Chandran: Hayek and Modern Liberalism.
J. C. Rees: 'Hayek on Liberty' in Philosophy, 38, 1963
M. M. Wilhelm: 'The political thought of F. A. Hayek' in Political
Studies, 20, 1972
J. Gray: Hayek on Liberty, 1984.
Eamon Butler: Hayek, 1963
Norman Barry: Hayek's Social and Economic Philosophy
N. Bosanquet: After the New Right
A. de Crespigny: 'Hayek' in Crespigny, ed., Contemporary Political
Philosophy
I. Kristol: Two Cheers for Capitalism (critical of Hayek from
a conservative point of view)
R. Plant: Equality, Markets and the State
J. R. Lucas: On Justice
Robert Nozick
R. Nozick: Anarchy, State and Utopia
R. Nozick: ‘Distributive justice', in Philosophy and Public Affairs,
3, 1973 and in J. Arthur and W. H. Shaw, eds Justice and Economic
Distribution
J. Paul, ed.: Reading Nozick
P. Pettit: Judging Justice, Pt. III
R. M. Hare: Moral Thinking, Ch. 9
O. O'Neill: 'Nozick's entitlements?', Inquiry, 1976
M. Davis: 'Necessity and Nozick's theory of entitlement', Political
Theory, 1977
A. Goldman: 'The entitlement theory of distributive justice',
J of Philosophy, 1976
W. Runciman: 'Processes, end-states and social justice', Phil.
Quart., 1978
M. Goldsmith: 'The entitlement theory of justice considered',
Political Studies, 1979
On the New Right in general
S. Hall & M. Jacques: The Politics of Thatcherism (useful
collection of articles)
D. Edgar: 'Bitter Harvest' in New Socialist, 13, Sept./Oct. 1983
(on right wing pressure groups)
D. Edgar: ‘Reagan's hidden agenda', Race and Class, winter, 1981
P. Foot: The Rise of Enoch Powell
R. Levitas, ed.: The Ideology of the New Right
D. G. Green: The New Right
N. Bosanquet: After the New Right
B. Jessop et al.: 'Authoritarian populism', NLR, 147, 1984
W. Keegan: Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment
R. Behrens: The Conservative Party from Heath to Thatcher
G. H. Nash: The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since
1945
M. W. Miles: The Odyssey of the American Right
M. P. Barry: The New Right
D. S. King: The New Right
A. Gamble: The Free Economy and the Strong State
G. A. Cohen et al: The New Right (very brief)
Ashford, Nigel and Davies, Stephen: A Dictionary of Conservative
and Libertarian Thought (London and New York, Routledge, 1991)
III. Restating Liberalism
General works on liberalism
R. P. Wolff: The Poverty of Liberalism
R. Eccleshall et al.: Political Ideologies
C. B. Macpherson: The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy
R. Eccleshall, ed.: British Liberalism: 1640s - 1980s
J. Acton: The History of Freedom and Other Essays
A. Arblaster: The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (esp.
historical survey)
C. Pateman: The Problem of Political Obligation
Rosenblum, R.: Another Liberalism (Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University
Press, 1987).
On Justice
D. Miller: Social Justice, Parts I & III
J. Arthur & W. H, Shaw, eds: Justice and Economic Distribution
J. Feinberg: Social Philosophy, Ch. 7
P. Pettit: Judging Justice
A. Brown: Modern Political Philosophy
S. Benn & R. Peter: Social Principles and the Democratic
State, Ch. 6
B. Barry: Political Argument, Ch. 6
N. E. Bowie & R. L. Simon: The Individual and the Political
Order, Chs. 4 & 7
D. D. Raphael: Problems of Political Philosophy, (useful collections
of articles):
J. Feinberg & H. Gross: The Philosophy of Law, Part III
T. L. Beauchamp, ed.: Ethics and Public Policy, Part II
R. E. Flatman: Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy,
Part IV
J. P. Sterba, ed.: Justice
R. B. Brandt, ed.: Social Justice
C. J. Friedrich & J. W. Chapman, eds: Justice (Nomos VI)
J. R. Lucas: On Justice
W. Galston: Justice and the Human Good
Fisk, Milton: The State and Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1989).
Scherer, Klaus R. (ed.): Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).
John Rawls
J. Rawls: A Theory of Justice esp. extracts in Arthur & Shaw
collection, Part I and Ch. 5
J. Rawls: 'Justice as fairness' in P. Laslett, ed. Philosophy,
Politics and Society
Rawls, J.: Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University
Press, 1993).
A. Ryan: 'John Rawls' in Q. Skinner, ed., The Return of Grand
Theory in the Human Sciences
R. P. Wolff: Understanding Rawls
N. Daniels, ed.: Reading Rawls
B. Barry: The Liberal Theory of Justice
P. Pettit: Judging Justice, Part V
Nielsen: article in Arthur & Shaw
D. Miller: Social Justice, pp. 40-51
A. Brown: Modern Political Philosophy, Ch. 3
M. Lessnoff: 'John Rawls' theory of justice', Political Studies,
1971
M. Sandel: 'Justice and the good' in his Liberalism and its Critics
Utilitarianism
J.S. Mill: Utilitarianism
P. Pettit,: Judging Justice, Part IV
Alan Brown: Modern Political Philosophy, Ch. 2
J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams: Utilitarianism: For and against
P. Singer: Practical Ethics
J. J. C. Smart: 'Distributive justice and utilitarianism' in
Arthur & Shaw, Justice and Economic Distribution
A. Sen & B. Williams, eds : Utilitarianism and Beyond,
CUP, 1981
D. H. Hodgson: Consequences of Utilitarianism, 1967
D. Parfit: Later selves and moral principles' in H. Montefiore,
Philosophy and Personal Relations, RKP, 1973
N. Rescher: Distributive Justice, 1966
J. Rawls: A Theory of Justice, relevant sections.
R. Nozick: Anarchy, State and Utopia, relevant sections.
M. Sandel, ed.: Liberalism and its Critics, Introduction.
Democracy
C. B. Macpherson: The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy
D. Held: Models of Democracy
P. Singer: Democracy and Disobedience
R.A. Dahl: Democracy and its Critics
J. Keane: Democracy and Civil Society
C. Pateman: Participation and Democratic Theory
F. A. Hayek: The Constitution of Liberty
Law and Morality
H. L. A. Hart: Law, Liberty and Morality
P. Devlin: The Enforcement of Morals
Bowie & Simon: The Individual and the Political Order (chapter)
R. Dworkin: The Philosophy of Law
S. Lee: Law and Morals
S. Hampshire: Public and Private Morality
L. Blom-Cooper et al.: Law and Morality
E. J. Mishan: Psychodelics: A Test Case
F. Logan: Should the law on Cannabis be Changed?
S. Bessemer: Anti-Obscenity
G. Lester & J Dicken: Feminism and Censorship
IV Problems of Socialism/ Equality
G. Kitching: Rethinking Socialism
M. Rustin: For a Pluralist Socialism
L. Johnston: Marxism, Class Analysis and Socialist Pluralism
S. Lukes: Power: A Radical View
S. Lukes: Marxism and Morality
S.E. Bronner: Socialism Unbound.
A. Skillen: Ruling Illusions: Philosophy and the social
order.
Miller, David: Market, State and Community (OUP) (for market
socialism and socialist community).
N. P. Barry, Introduction to Modern Political Theory, Chapter 7.
V. Gender/ Sexuality
Schochet, G.: Patriarchalism in Political Thought.
Lloyd, G.: The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘female’ in western
philosophy.
Pateman, C.: The Sexual Contract.
Pateman, C. and Gross, E.: Feminist Challenges: Social
and political theory.
Philllips, A.: Engendering Democracy.
Gould, C. G.: Rethinking Democracy.
Mohr, Richard D.: Gays/Justice.
Mohr, Richard D.: Gay Ideas: Outing and other controversies
(Beacon Press, Boston, 1992)
Okin, S. M.: Women in Western Political Thought.
Okin, S. M.: Justice, Gender, and the Family
Elshtain, J. B.: Public Man, Private Woman: Women in social
and political thought.
Evans, J. et al.: Feminism and Political Theory.
Siltanen, J. and Stanworth, M.: Women and the Public Sphere.
Gilligan, C.: In a Different Voice.
O’Brien, M.: The Politics of Reproduction.
VI. Communitarianism.
Avineri, S. et al (eds.) Communitarianism and Individualism (useful
collection with a lot of references to further reading)
Daniels, N.: ‘Equal liberty and unequal worth of liberty’ in
N. Daniels, ed. Reading Rawls.
Fisk, M.: ‘History and reason in Rawls’ moral theory’ in N. Daniels,
ed. Reading Rawls.
Marilyn Friedman ‘Feminism and modern friendship’ in Avineri et al.
(eds) Communitarianism and Individualism, pp. 101-119.
Gutmann, Amy: ‘Communitarian Critics of Liberalism’ in Avineri
et al. Communitarianism and Individualism, pp. 120-136.
Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P.: Rawls: A theory of justice
and its critics, Ch. 6.
Kymlicka, W.: Liberalism, Community and Culture.
Kymlicka, W.: Contemporary Political Philosophy, Ch. 6.
Kymlicka, W.: ‘Community’ in Blackwell’s A Companion to Contemporary
Political Philosophy.
Larmore, C.: Patterns of Moral Complexity.
Lukes, S.: Marxism and Morality, Ch. 3, pp. 27-36.
MacIntyre, A.: After Virtue.
MacIntyre, A.: Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
Mulhall, S. & Swift, A.: Liberals and Communitarians.
Okin, S. M.: Justice, Gender, and the Family, Chs. 2-3 &
6.
Sandel, M. J.: Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
Sandel, M. J.: ‘Justice and the good’ in Liberalism and its Critics.
Sandel, M. J.: ‘Morality and the Liberal Ideal’, The New Republic,
190/8, 7 May 1984.
Shapiro, I.: Political Criticism, esp. Ch. 3.
Walzer, M.: Spheres of Justice.
Young, I. M.: ‘The ideal of community and the politics of difference’
in Feminism/Postmodernism (ed. L. J. Nicholson).
VII. Green Political Thought
Bahro, R.: Socialism and Survival.
Ball, T. & Dagger, R.: Political Ideologies and the Democratic
Ideal, Ch. 9.
Bookchin, M.: Post-Scarcity Anarchism.
Bookchin, M.: The Ecology of Freedom.
Dobson, A.: Green Political Thought.
Eckersley, R.: ‘Just natural relations? Recent developments
in environmental political theory.’ Political Theory Newsletter, 5/2, Sept.
1993, pp. 110-125.
Passmore, J.: Man’s Responsibility for Nature.
Ryle, M.: Ecology and Socialism.
Spretnak, C. & Capra, F. Green Politics.
Thomas, K.: Man and the Natural World: A history of modern
sensibility.
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