

Notes

Notes

1. One of these will be described in Chapter 3.
2. Some Nietzsche scholars draw our attention to the influence of Roman satire on key sections of his famous book, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. For example, see Kathleen M. Higgins, *Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), Chapter 7, where she discusses the influence of Lucius Apuleius (c.123–c.170), author of *The Golden Ass* (or *Transformations* [*Metamorphoseos*]).
3. In 1854, Wagner sent Schopenhauer a copy of his *Der Ring des Nibelungen* “with admiration and gratitude.” Nietzsche was still a youngster at the time.
4. Nietzsche also felt that Wagner had insulted him, rather embarrassingly, by offering to others unjustified speculations about the sexual causes of his poor health. See Siegfried Mandel’s *Nietzsche and the Jews* (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998), “The Deadly Insult,” p. 118. See also Joachim Köhler’s *Nietzsche and Wagner – A Lesson in Subjugation* (New Haven, CN and London: Yale University Press, 1998), “A Mortal Insult,” pp. 147ff.
5. The excerpt is from Donne’s *Meditation 17*.
6. In the twentieth century alone, the mind-numbing number of people deliberately killed for an assortment of ideological and religious reasons – an estimated 80 million – is nothing less than staggering. For a discussion of this, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control – Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century* (New York: Collier Books, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), especially “Part I – The Politics of Organized Insanity.”

7. The phrase, "through a glass darkly," is from St. Paul (1 Corinthians 13:12), where it is suggested that during our earthly lives, we humans can perceive and understand the universe and ourselves only very imperfectly, although in the next life we will behold the truth, when we see ourselves as God sees us. Kant's philosophy preserves a similar faith.
8. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, §28.
9. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, §17, Nietzsche foreshadows an aspect of Freud's conception of the "id." The word "id" means "it" in Latin, and it signifies for Freud a part of one's mental life – the seat of one's instinctual desires – that remains alien and mostly impervious to conscious introspection. The id is an amoral, instinctual part of ourselves that we cannot easily admit as being a real part of ourselves. Hence within us, it remains as an "it" or as an "other," to our conscious, generally law-abiding, selves.
10. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *The Vocation of Man*, Book III, "Faith," Part II.
11. The mythical image of the worm or snake biting its own tail – the Ouroboros – aptly symbolizes the Nietzschean understanding of the universe. In Nietzsche's vision, we encounter nothing more than a field of energy that is self-contained and endlessly recycling.
12. Schopenhauer offers a paradigm image:

The most glaring example of this kind is provided by the bulldog-ant of Australia: when one cuts it in half, a fight begins between the head and the tail – each attacks the other with bites and stings, and this struggle goes on bravely for half an hour, until they die, or are carried away by other ants. This happens every time. (*The World as Will and Representation*, Volume I, §27)
13. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, §63. Schopenhauer advances this judgment under the assumption of traditional Christian moral values. If one were to abandon these values, as Nietzsche does, then the conclusion that human beings have a low worth would not obviously follow.
14. Ibid. The word "his" in the above excerpt is intended generally to mean "his or her."
15. This can refer to Schopenhauer's standpoint of moral awareness, where we adopt the perspective of humanity in general and become immersed in the sins and suffering of the world as a whole.
16. This can refer to Schopenhauer's standpoint of ascetic awareness and the "denial of the will," where we renounce the daily lifestyle of typical human culture. Since many of the ascetics that Schopenhauer discusses

believed in God (as does the saint), the thought that the saint here represents "ascetic consciousness" is consistent with Schopenhauer's texts.

17. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "Zarathustra's Prologue," §2.
18. There is debate about whether Nietzsche concerned himself with the plight of humanity, in general or only with a select group of extremely healthy people. When Zarathustra starts his spiritual journey, he says that "he loves people," but by the end of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he gravitates to a small subset of "higher" ones – people who represent the best that the existing culture can offer. There is some literary evidence that Nietzsche nonetheless had general human interests in mind here, because one of the probable inspirations for the end of the book, Goethe's poem "Die Geheimnisse" ("The Secrets"), describes a Zarathustra-like leader named "Humannus" (representing the essence of humanity) who addresses a set of twelve representatives of the world's nations or religions.

For a synopsis of this poem, along with suggestions of its connection to the symbolism of Martin Luther's "rose and cross" coat of arms, see Karl Löwith's *From Hegel to Nietzsche* [1941] (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967), Introduction, §2, "Rose and Cross." For Luther's own explanation of his "rose and cross" symbolism, see his letter sent from Coburg Castle to Lazarus Spengler, 8 July, 1530. Nietzsche's Zarathustra finally crowns himself with a wreath of roses – one that replaces the wreath of ivy that he wore as a mere scholar.
19. Nietzsche's saint, as described in *Zarathustra*, has noticeably detached himself from the ordinary social world of the market place. St. Francis of Assisi can be seen as a related inspirational figure for Nietzsche's Zarathustra, for there are striking parallels between Zarathustra's (and Nietzsche's) experiences and those of St. Francis. To begin, the latter was of weak physical constitution, but remained very strong-willed. Moreover, St. Francis was once labelled a heretic, he was accompanied by a falcon (Zarathustra was accompanied by an eagle), he called himself "God's fool" and "Brother Ass," he was disillusioned by the materialistic society that eventually infiltrated his following, he retired into caves for reclusive meditation, he often wept bitterly, he was descended upon by a flock of birds at a point of enlightenment (*Zarathustra* ends with this kind of event), he was reputed to have sung troubadour songs when young, he devoted his life to a feminized ideal which in Francis's case was "Lady Poverty," and he fought a spiritual battle against the desires of the flesh. One might go so far as to say that Nietzsche identified rather strongly with St. Francis's trials and redemption through suffering. If we ask the question, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?", much is revealed by regarding St. Francis as significantly

informing Nietzsche's underlying model – despite St. Francis's Christian view that everyone is equal before God.

Nietzsche's Zarathustra is not a one-dimensional figure, however, and Zarathustra is more of an artistically-formed composite, like a compacted dream-image. Strong inspirational parallels also obtain between Zarathustra and possibly the greatest alchemist of all time, Paracelsus (Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim, 1493–1541). Paracelsus, from Switzerland (Nietzsche referred to himself as “Swiss”), attacked the greediness of the apothecaries, rebelled against authority and established book learning, traveled with a group of devoted followers, was perceived to be a charlatan by many, and upheld noble values and piety. Paracelsus also developed, interestingly enough, a treatment for syphilis.

20. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf (1848–1931) – a young scholar who would later become a great German philologist – immediately attacked Nietzsche's book in a thirty-two-page pamphlet sarcastically titled *Philology of the Future*.

21. During his time as a professor of classics, Nietzsche taught courses in the Greek lyric poets, the Greek dramatists, Latin grammar, Hesiod, the Pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato's *Dialogues*, and Greek and Roman rhetoric.

22. For example, see *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part II, “On the Virtuous.” Nietzsche's alienation from the values of the market place is reflected in his subtitle of the book, as one “for all and none.” This is evident from Part IV, “On the Higher Person,” §1, where Zarathustra states, “I stood in the market place; and as I spoke to all, I spoke to none.”

23. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §16.

24. As a paradigmatic image, we can recall the fierce and uncontrollable anger of Achilles, which was not considered to be excessive, but instead understandable and natural for his military situation.

25. This basic idea is also expressed in the “First Noble Truth” of Buddhism. Within the Buddhist context, it is observed that life contains aspects that tend to make it “sour” or frustrating, such as sickness, old age, and death.

26. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §2.

27. This style of three-fold analysis was common in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it was inspired by the three-fold form of the logical syllogism which Kant used to structure synoptically his theory of knowledge. For instance, Friedrich Schiller (who was inspired by Kant), divided human development into the sensory, aesthetic, and intellectual phases; Hegel (among tens of other such triads) divided the world of art into the “symbolic, classical, and romantic” periods; Marx famously divided economic history into feudal, capitalist, and communist periods.

Nietzsche followed suit in his analysis of world history, using a pre-Greek, classical Greek, and post-Greek triad.

28. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §18.

29. The German word “*Last*” is usually translated as “joy” or “pleasure” in the sense of suggesting “merriment” and “festivity.” Given, however, the ecstatic component of the experience Nietzsche describes when one becomes one with life-energies, this usual translation does not fully convey the power of the experience – one which, owing to its tapping into the strongest life-energy surges that humans experience, has distinctively organic associations. The pleasure at the heart of existence, in other words, is felt through a pleasure that resonates sexually.

30. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §17. Nietzsche refers indiscriminately to both a thrill in “existence” and a thrill in “life,” speaking of them here as if life and existence were one and the same. This identity between “existence-affirmation” and “life-affirmation” will be discussed critically in Chapter 6.

31. *Ibid.*, §7.

32. Recall Schopenhauer's view (reiterated here by Nietzsche) that the principle of sufficient reason – a mode of disjective, integrative, and fundamentally literalistic interpretation that we ourselves project – is the cause of all individuation, and hence, a reason why we perceive a fragmented world of conflicting individuals.

33. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §10.

34. The strategy of achieving greater wisdom by expanding one's finite perspective to cosmic levels has a long history in world philosophies. Among the views of this type that strongly influenced the early nineteenth-century philosophical world was that of the seventeenth-century Jewish philosopher Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza (1632–77). See his *Ethics* (1677).

35. In his later thought, Nietzsche claimed that he no longer aspired to experience a “metaphysical comfort” through a transcendent, or extraordinary, mode of awareness, and maintained instead that “you ought to learn the art of *this-worldly* comfort first; you ought to learn to laugh” (“Attempt at Self-Criticism,” Nietzsche's Preface to the 1886 reissue of *The Birth of Tragedy*).

36. An illuminating example is the “high-minded” or “great-souled” person (*megalopsychos*) who stands at the pinnacle of Aristotle's ethical vision. As a consequence of this type of person's rational and tempered quality, such a person, although willing to face great risks, is fundamentally “not fond of risks” (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1124b). Nietzsche's superhuman ideal, in contrast, urges that one make danger “one's vocation” and love the idea of taking risks in a daredevil fashion.

37. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §19.
38. *Ibid.*, §18.
39. *Ibid.*, §19.
40. *Ibid.*, §17.
41. *Ibid.*, §17.
42. This problem also has a practical correlate in Nietzsche's thought. As a leading voice of insubordination, he intends to be the master voice for all those who despise servitude to any masters or leaders.
43. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §15.
44. Standing in thought-provoking contrast to this quote is a remark from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "On Self-Overcoming," where Nietzsche claims that indirect, seductive approaches are weaker than the direct, head-on, and presumably more truthful approaches. One might reconcile the two remarks by saying that when one approaches the dangerous and overwhelming reality that is mother nature, one needs to be cautious, which is to say that here, the straightforward lance of reason – the traditional tool of "the scholar," as Nietzsche sees it – is not regarded as strong enough to pin down the truth.
45. For instance, Nietzsche suggests that in some central cases, if we examine the history of the situation, "humility" becomes a mask for "courage," and the "belief in justice" becomes a mask for "hope for revenge." See his *On the Genealogy of Morals*, First Essay, §14.
46. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, First Essay, §17.
47. Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in a Morally-Disengaged Sense."
48. Under this interpretation, one need not ascribe an inconsistent "there is no truth" thesis to Nietzsche in this early essay, and hence overlook its importance as an expression of the generally Kantian outlook that Nietzsche had inherited from Schopenhauer. When Nietzsche asks, "What, then is truth?" he is best interpreted as asking about the "truths" we tend to take for granted in our everyday lives, rather than about the nature of truth itself.
49. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (A42/B59).
50. Nietzsche criticizes the tendencies that narrow down a person to the point of absurd specialization (see *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "On Redemption") and he refers to those who are, as he says, nothing but a large "eye" or a large "ear," as "inverse cripples." These people – among whom, Nietzsche acknowledges, some have been called "geniuses" – are not crippled people who lack an arm or a leg, or an ear, but who are nothing more than an arm, or a leg, or an ear. One wonders, then, how Nietzsche would have assessed the impressionist paintings of his contemporary, Claude
- Monet (1840–1926), of whom yet another contemporary, Paul Cézanne (1839–1906) said was "just an eye, but what an eye!"
51. Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Humanity*, Sixth Letter.
52. Karl Marx, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, "Bourgeois and Proletariat."
53. Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Humanity*, Sixth Letter. As noted above in the discussion of Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*, this effort to return to the classical Greeks was influenced by the writings of Johann Winckelmann (1717–68), whose articles and books on classical Greek art (especially sculpture) portrayed Greek culture as one of humanity's healthiest and most beautiful manifestations.
54. Such questions arose in the philosophical area called "hermeneutics" or "theory of interpretation." Initially, the assumption was that one could learn ancient Greek, absorb as much as one could about Greek cultural history, actively put aside one's present-day influences, and reach a clear understanding of what the Greek cultural atmosphere was like. As reflections within the theory of interpretation continued, the view that one can never transcend one's own time period became increasingly influential. Some of the key figures in the history of hermeneutics implicitly referred to here are Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976).
55. This tension arises in *The Birth of Tragedy*, where Nietzsche considers resurrecting the Dionysian-Greek spirit in a particularly "German" way – one that would include the music of Richard Wagner and the use of the German mythology.
56. In 1804, F. W. J. Schelling refers to this idea (in connection with the crucifixion) in his lectures on the philosophy of art; in 1807, G. W. F. Hegel uses the phrase "God is dead" several times in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*.
57. See the section on the "Unhappy Consciousness" in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, especially §225. The "dark night of the soul" imagery is from St. John of the Cross (1542–91). See the complete text of his *Ascent of Mt. Carmel* (1578–88).
58. Strong expressions of, and general interests in, nihilism often follow times of war. In the wake of the First World War, the Dada movement in Switzerland expressed a nihilistic protest against the technological style of reason that appeared to constitute the worldviews responsible for the European devastation; after the Second World War, intellectual interest in nihilism increased in both Germany and Japan.
59. In an autobiographical sketch written when he was a teenager (1858), Nietzsche described his reaction to his father's death:

When I woke up that morning, I heard loud crying and sobbing all around me. My dear mother entered in tears and cried out, wailing, "Oh God! My dear Ludwig is dead!" Although I was still young and inexperienced, I did have some idea of death; I was seized by the thought of being forever separated from my beloved father, and I cried bitterly.

The days following passed by in tears and in preparation for the burial. Oh God! I had become a fatherless orphan, and my mother had become a widow! – On 2 August the earthly remains of my dear father were entrusted into the womb of the earth... At one in the afternoon the ceremony began with a full tolling of the bells. Oh, the sound of those stifling bells will never leave my ears, and I will never forget the gloomy sounding melody of the hymn *Jesu meine Zuversicht* [Jesus, my Confidence]. ("From my Life" ["*Aus meinem Leben*"])

Nietzsche soon thereafter (at the end of January 1850) had a dream, which he described as follows:

During that time I once dreamed that I heard the church organ playing, as if it were a funeral. When I went to see what was happening, a grave suddenly opened up, and my father emerged, dressed in burial clothes. He hurries into the church and returns quickly again with a small child in his arms. The grave-mound opens up, he climbs in and the cover sinks back over the opening. The roaring sound of the organ goes silent and I wake up. – The next day little Joseph [Nietzsche's two-year-old brother] is suddenly unwell, goes into convulsions, and dies within a few hours. Our pain is terrible. My dream was completely realized. The little body was laid in the arms of my father. – With this double misfortune God in heaven was our single consolation and refuge. ("From my Life" ["*Aus meinem Leben*"])

60. See, for example, Nietzsche's discussion in *The Antichrist*, §39, where he claims that the motivating force at the root of Christianity is a "hatred of reality." This theme will be discussed further in Chapter 6, in the section on "existence-affirmation." We will see that the gap between "what is" and "what ought to be" tends to widen in proportion to one's dissatisfaction with "what is."

61. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, §18.

62. The main animal urges Nietzsche identifies are "sex," "the lust to rule," and "selfishness." See *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part III, "The Three Evils."

63. Nietzsche expressed a similar idea in *The Birth of Tragedy*, except that the cause of the objectionable human condition was not said to be the Christian God, but Socratic, rationalistic thinking taken to the extreme. In both of his analyses, he identifies forces that suppress and constrict the "feral" or "wildlife" energies that he consistently refers to as "Dionysian."

64. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Second Essay, §22.

65. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Fourth Part, "The Ugliest Man." In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche said of himself that "I am by far the most awful human being that has so far existed; this does not preclude the possibility that I shall be the most beneficial" (*Ecce Homo*, "Why I am an Inevitability," §2). Nietzsche said this, presumably, because he believed that the truths he had to convey were "awful." One would suspect that these were the truths that "God is dead" (i.e., Nietzsche himself is one important "murderer" of God), the doctrine of the "will to power," the doctrine of the "superhuman," and the "doctrine of eternal recurrence."

66. One of the archetypal characters in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a tightrope walker, who is referred to as "lamefoot." That the name "Oedipus" means "swollen foot" and the fact that this classical character famously killed his father and married his mother supports the idea that understanding Nietzsche requires us to investigate psychologically the "death-of-the-father" theme, given the centrality of the "death of God" theme in Nietzsche's work. For Nietzsche, the tightrope walker is celebrated as one who lives dangerously, but who inevitably goes down as well.

Nietzsche clearly idealizes and inflates both father and mother figures within his thought. He emphasizes on the one hand that the absolute father figure (God) must be killed, and on the other that one should seek reunification and absorption into the absolute mother figure (viz., the "eternal-feminine" or "mother nature" or Moira, the impersonal Greek goddess of fate [cf. *amor fati* in Nietzsche], whose Roman correlate is Parca, which means "birth"). The "death of God" theme and the "Nietzsche and woman" theme are thus two sides of the same coin.

67. The connection made here is an extended one. For the more psychoanalytically focused details of Freud's view, see his *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Chapter XXI, "The Development of the Libido." Freud mentions here that if a person does not reconcile the tensions of the Oedipus Complex, then the (male) person can become neurotic, and can remain bowed beneath his father's authority throughout his life. On his

- view, the rules of society eventually take the place of the father's authority and dominate as a "superego" within a person's psyche. The striving for self-definition as an individual thus transforms into a conflict between individuality (me) and sociality (in Heidegger's terms "the They" [*das Man*]) – a conflict which is a keystone of Nietzsche's philosophy.
68. An accurate description of this kind of perspectival impasse can be found in R. D. Laing's *Knots* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 5–6.
69. The reference is to the prayers recited or sung at a Christian mass for the dead. More typically, the words are "*requiem aeternam dona ei (eis), Domine*" (eternal rest grant unto him/her (them), O Lord).
70. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, §125.
71. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra's Prologue, §5.
72. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I Write Such Good Books," §1.
73. Ibid., "Why I am an Inevitability," §1. In his notebooks of the same year (1888) [§107], Nietzsche referred to Wagner as an "inevitability" (*ein Schicksal*, or "destiny") as well, except that it was in the more limited context of his reflections on Wagner's subsequent influence on German culture.
74. Ibid., §2.
75. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Book Three, §108.
76. Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human*, Part II, "The Wanderer and his Shadow," §14.
77. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Book Three, §109.
78. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," §7. The emphasis on the word "chance" is in original.
79. Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, Book II, §130.
80. Nietzsche's particular version of this "life-focused" outlook is complicated by the influential development of physiology in Germany after 1830, and his discussions of "life" often tend towards physiological formulations. Nietzsche's association of "life" with the conditions especially germane to development, growth, breaking through one's former limits, and metamorphosis – as opposed to the conditions for biological balance and homeostasis – reveal within his thought, nonetheless, the predominance of the teleological, or progress-oriented, mentality that prevailed during the nineteenth century in general.
81. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," §5.
82. Just as Immanuel Kant believed that logical thinking, along with spatial and temporal orderings, was an inescapable aspect of our human style of interpreting the world, Nietzsche believed that "immoral" behavior is an inescapable aspect of our style of interpretation as living beings.
83. In his postulation of the Oedipus Complex, Sigmund Freud asserted much the same thing. The doctrine of original sin is also echoed here.
84. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil – Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, "What is Distinguished," §259.
85. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Second Essay, §11.
86. There were some pre-Nietzschean efforts to formulate perspectives that were "beyond" or "above" the traditional "moral" outlooks, insofar as these outlooks were considered negatively, as being either too rigidly mechanical, overly rule-governed, and/or morally uninspiring (i.e., as not expressing the "true" moral spirit). One example is in Hegel's early writings (e.g., "The Spirit of Christianity," 1797), where he stated that via the feeling of love, all thought of [Kantian] duties vanishes, and one rises above the whole [mechanically defined] sphere of justice and injustice. A slightly more extreme example is in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard (1813–55), who characterized the paradoxical and incomprehensible "religious" perspective as one located beyond the rationally-grounded and rule-governed "ethical" perspective. He referred to this as the "teleological suspension of the ethical" in *Fear and Trembling* (1843).
87. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Morality as Anti-Nature," §5.
88. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part II, "On Self-Overcoming."
89. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, §21, Nietzsche also invokes this image of a person who is located at the "heart of life":
- If a person put his ear, so to speak, upon the heart chamber of the world-will, and felt the furious craving for existence, pouring out from there into all of the veins of the world, as a thundering river or as the softest sprinkle of stream, how could he not suddenly break into pieces?
- This excerpt, and the one cited above from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, shows that one of the key thoughts in Nietzsche's philosophy – the idea of life-affirmation – is linked with the experience of feeling the surging and potentially self-disintegrating energies of life within oneself. It reveals also that Nietzsche's early studies of the experience of dramatic tragedy (where he discovers this experience of life) are central to understanding his philosophy.
90. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §13.
91. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, §6.
92. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "The Problem of Socrates," §9.
93. Nietzsche, Notebook excerpt from 1885, §1067. The excerpt is memorable, but it should be kept in mind that it remains a notebook entry, and

- that its main value here is to convey the chilling atmosphere of Nietzsche's atheistic vision, which he expressed in various ways.
94. Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in a Morally-Disengaged Sense."
95. A cluster of words characterizes the atmosphere of the perspective at hand. The standpoint is "dislocated," "disconnected," "dissociated," "disengaged," and "detached." One of the prominent feelings that Nietzsche's philosophy conveys is one of dislocation. It is Nietzsche as the wanderer, the gypsy, the homeless, the alienated, and "the one who is different."
96. Here, life is said to be "immoral," rather than "amoral." Both characterizations fit, but Nietzsche tends to use the former term. As a literary gauge for appreciating the general difference between an "immoral" and an "amoral" consciousness – as they represent nineteenth vs. twentieth-century problematics, respectively – we can contrast Dostoevski's Raskolnikov (who critically ponders the significance of moral contexts) with Camus's Merseult (who simply seems to lack sensitivity to moral contexts). David Hudson pointed out to me in conversation this useful contrast between *Crime and Punishment* (1866) and *The Stranger* (1946).
97. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I am so Wise," §2.
98. *Ibid.*, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," §1.
99. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Book Four, §341.
100. Kathleen Higgins develops the philosophical connection between Descartes and Nietzsche within this context. See her *Comic Relief – Nietzsche's Gay Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Chapter Six.
101. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Third Essay, §14.
102. The German word *Übermensch* translates literally as "over-person" or "over-human," but this translation does not convey the meaning well. Some translate it into English as "overman," since "over" suggests both the idea of "looking down" or "being above" in semantic fusion with the idea of "crossing over." The German word "*Mensch*," though, refers to people in general, and not to men in particular, so "overman" has a sexist overtone. (This overtone might not have been particularly objectionable to Nietzsche.) The term "*Übermensch*" also suggests the perspective of someone who is located in the balcony of life's theater, looking down upon the stage; or it suggests someone who is in the play itself, watching himself or herself in the performance imaginatively from above. In each case there is a perspectival "distance" from the ordinary scene. The present translation of "*Übermensch*" as "superhuman" suggests that this being possesses extraordinary willpower – so much so as to be qualitatively different in consciousness, in contrast to most people.
103. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §56.
104. This is a quote from Mother Theresa, mentioned in the final homily of Cardinal O'Connor of New York, given at St. Patrick's Cathedral, 20 February 2000. A related attitude is expressed by St. Paul: "whatever does not proceed from faith, is sin" (Romans 14:23).
105. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I am an Inevitability," §9.
106. Nietzsche, Notebook excerpt from March–June 1888, §1052. This excerpt from 1888 mirrors Nietzsche's account of the aesthetic experience of tragedy described sixteen years earlier in *The Birth of Tragedy*, §7 (quoted earlier), and is evidence of a strong continuity in his thought with respect to his interpretation of the Greeks.
107. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I Write Such Good Books," §1.
108. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche mentioned that "one could consider the whole of *Zarathustra* as music" (*Ecce Homo*, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," §1). If we recall Nietzsche's earlier interest in helping to inspire a more life-affirming "tragic culture," and his celebration of Bach, Beethoven and Wagner in *The Birth of Tragedy* as artistic forces supportive of this end, then *Zarathustra* "as music" can be read as a continuation of this project of cultural revision. The famous doctrines of the superhuman, the eternal recurrence, the will-to-power, and the death of God, consequently would express a fundamentally tragic sense of life, as it stands tempered and amalgamated with a stronger, down-to-earth sense of life-affirmation, and its accompanying laughter, dancing, and joyous thrill – which is to say that Nietzschean laughter is informed by life's difficulties.
109. Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human*, "Assorted Opinions and Maxims," §180. Nietzsche is inspired here by Wagner's concept of the "total-artwork" (*Gesamtkunstwerk*), which advocated an amalgamation of all operatic devices – music, verse, staging – into a complete whole. See Wagner's *Opera and Drama* (*Oper und Drama* [1850–51]) and *The Artwork of the Future* (*Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft* [1849]), whose title, incidentally, supplies material for Nietzsche's later preoccupation with future philosophy and future ideals.
110. See, for example, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part II, "On Priests."
111. As the opposite of the superhuman type, Nietzsche described at the very beginning of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the "last man" (*der letzte Mensch*) – a type of temperate person who does not push anything to excess, and who aims at a pleasurable balanced life. Such a person might enjoy a pleasant walk in the hills, but would never dare to go mountain-climbing, lest a fatal accident occur. Such a person would live carefully, and not very dangerously, in other words. If one interprets Nietzsche's

superhuman as a Dionysian antagonist to this moderate, temperate, proportionate, and balanced type of person (cf. Aristotle's doctrine of the mean), then one can import the ethics of hard work into the superhuman framework, and further link Nietzsche's superhuman with Kant's suggestion that we have a moral obligation to develop our talents significantly (see Kant's *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Second Section) and, implicitly, commit ourselves to developing them extremely, and not only halfway, or merely "in moderation."

At a greater extreme, Nietzsche's "last man" can be linked with idleness or laziness – the kinds of sin that brought down the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, insofar as idleness and laziness generate a weakness of character that opens a person to temptation.

112. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I Am So Wise," §2.

113. Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* – *A Book for All and None*, when regarded as a work of confessional literature, illuminates the idea of "Nietzschean laughter" in the present context. One can imagine the reaction of a person, who, after having earnestly set forth a confession in a confessional booth, noticed afterwards that there had been no one in the priest's seat. The consequent laughter might be very strong. The idea that "all the world's a stage" in the absence of an audience would be analogous.

114. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, §339.

115. Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, §170.

116. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §3.

117. The Medusa, more thoroughly considered, is a complicated Janus-like image combining both Apollonian and Dionysian aspects, since Medusa was once a beautiful woman. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche emphasizes her Dionysian aspect.

118. The Medusa image is more important in Nietzsche's writings than an English-language reader might initially realize, though, since Walter Kaufmann's widely-used translation [1967] (along with Francis Golffing's earlier one [1956]) of *The Birth of Tragedy* renders the specific "das Medusenhaupt" more generically, as "Gorgon's head" (e.g., see §2).

119. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Preface to Second Edition (1886).

120. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §15.

121. The presence of mixed emotions, or ambivalence, or what sometimes appears to be contradictory perspectives on Nietzsche's part, can be understood in light of his fundamental insight that the quality of lived human experience typically involves complicated amalgams of feelings and judgments. This indicates that within concrete human awareness, metaphorical styles of thinking – those which can fuse manifestly opposite outlooks, as

in the semantically-condensed images of dreams – are considered to be foundational. It also indicates that wisdom, considered as a style of discrimination among a set of interconnected variables, is regarded as a more existentially central thought-process than the atomized and abstracted styles of knowledge, all of which require that each element is definitionally self-contained.

122. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Fourth Part, "The Ugliest Man."

123. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §40.

124. Nietzsche, Notebooks of March–June 1888 (§293).

125. Nietzsche, Notebooks of 1884 (§602). This excerpt illuminates Nietzsche's "profound superficiality" prescription of 1886 (see the Preface to *The Gay Science*).

126. Nietzsche often uses the intellectual strategy of dissolving a standardly accepted conceptual distinction in order to advance an alternative standpoint. In *The Gay Science* §103, for example, he claimed that if one recognizes that there are no "purposes" in the fabric of things, then one would realize that there are no "accidents" either.

127. Maudemarie Clark, in her *Nietzsche On Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), offers a first-rate scholarly account of Nietzsche's development within this context. The distinction presented below between "perspectivism" and "interpretationism" is also indebted to the basic insights of Clark's study.

128. The reference here is to Kant, who asserted the identity of the transcendental object and transcendental subject in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (A109).

129. Nietzsche, Notebook entry, Spring–Fall, 1887 [§552].

130. *Ibid.*

131. *Ibid.* [§569].

132. In 1887, we encounter residual expressions of his earlier and prevailing view, such as *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Third Essay, §12, which carries a distinctively Kantian flavor. In contrast, we can note in the same year a notebook entry [§507] where Nietzsche states that the seemingly neutral distinction between the real and apparent world arises only on account of value postulations. A more radical statement – one expressive of the more purely "interpretationist" view – can be found in Nietzsche's notebooks of 1888 [§567]:

The perspective therefore provides the character of the "appearance"! As if a world would still be left over after one subtracted the perspective! By doing that one would subtract *relativity*!

133. Charles F. Wallraff, translator of Karl Jaspers' *Nietzsche* (1935), and student of Jaspers in Heidelberg in 1935, used the term "interpretationism" to characterize his own views, as expressed in *Philosophical Theory and Psychological Fact* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1961).
134. For a detailed scholarly analysis of the various competing formulations of Nietzsche's perspectivism, see Clark, Chapter 5, "Perspectivism."
135. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Reason" in Philosophy," §2. The idea that "reason" is a mode of falsification recalls Schopenhauer's interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason. Here, the sensory flux takes the place of Schopenhauer's "thing-in-itself," both of which are believed to be falsified by means of reason.
136. *Ibid.*, "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable."
137. This Nietzschean position was developed by Jean-Paul Sartre in his *Being and Nothingness* (1943). See the first section of his Introduction to that work, "I. The Phenomenon."
138. Among twentieth-century theories of linguistic meaning, and related to this Nietzschean position, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) held that the meanings of words such as "pain" are not grounded upon references to each of our private, hidden-from-everyone-else (i.e., like inaccessible "thing-in-themselves") experiences. See Wittgenstein's much-discussed "beetle in the box" example in his *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), §293.
139. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Maxims and Arrows," §27.
140. This image of the painted rice-cake is from Dōgen, the thirteenth-century Japanese Zen master. The interpretation offered here of Nietzsche's views on "truth as an empty mask" in conjunction with his emphasis on "existence-affirmation" (as opposed to "life-affirmation") is inspired by Dōgen.
141. See *The Tibetan Book for the Dead*, "The Twelfth Day."
142. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part II, "On the Riffraff" A more abstract and far-reaching interpretation of this remark is that no human being can escape "the rabble," insofar as everyone's awareness is necessarily formed within some given cultural tradition and set of social and linguistic values. Nietzsche would not, then, simply be lamenting the presence of "the riffraff" or "the rabble" outside of himself in everyday society; he would be lamenting the presence of the currently imperfectly existing society within himself, as it constitutes his consciousness through the language he has learned and the cultural values he has necessarily absorbed as a matter of upbringing.
143. *Ibid.*, Part III, "The Convalescent," §2.

144. At the end of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, we learn that feeling "pity" for even the most spiritually advanced types of people (which might include Nietzsche himself, and so we would also be speaking here of self-pity) – along with pity for suffering in general – is the "final sin" that Zarathustra supposedly overcomes. One might ask why "pity" is accorded such a central place in Zarathustra's spiritual development, since there are many virtues and vices which color human experience.

Aristotle's theory of tragedy is of some significance here. For him, pity and fear in proportionate combination within the tragic experience operate homeopathically to clear the mind of those disturbing emotions themselves. He adds that pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune. Hence, if one regards the world as morally godless, as a stage, and as a tragedy, then one will experience pity in accord with this theory, and the therapeutic task will then be to use one's judgment in an effort to adopt a perspective through which the experience of potentially overwhelming pity can be controlled, and such that the experience of pity can be positively cathartic, rather than vicious and nihilistically debilitating. Whether Nietzsche completely overcame his feelings of self-pity is an open question.

145. Philip J. Ivanhoe suggested to me the phrase "affirmation of flourishing" as a synonym for "affirmation of health."

146. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I am so Clever," §10.

147. *Ibid.*, §9.

148. *Ibid.*, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," §6.

149. Given its attention to minute detail, Nietzsche's first expression of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence (*The Gay Science*, §341), quoted earlier, was perhaps his strongest formulation.

150. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part III, "The Seven Seals." It is worth noting that there is a reference to "seven seals" in Revelation 5:1. In that passage, the biblical image is of God who sits on a throne with a scroll that has been sealed with seven seals, upon which the future has been written.

151. See Walter Kaufmann, *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York: The Viking Press, 1968), p. 263.

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153. Albert Camus developed an outline for such a lifestyle in his conception of "the absurd lifestyle" in *The Myth of Sisyphus*. Camus's outlook resonates with the Japanese heroic tradition or "way of the warrior"

(*bushido*), to the extent that this tradition also acknowledges the nobility of fighting a losing battle. In addition, Kierkegaard's "knight of faith" (see his *Fear and Trembling*) is also closely related to this idea.

154. Within the present Nietzschean, fundamentally atheistic, context, it should not escape our notice that the thought that "existence is a perfection," or that "it is better to be than not to be," is foundational to the ontological argument for God's existence. One might say that in some of his reflections, Nietzsche turns raw existence itself into God, or more precisely, into that which is absolutely "holy." See the excerpt from Nietzsche's notebooks, March–June 1888 [§1052] cited above.

155. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, §57.

156. This Nietzschean idea of reinterpreting everyday moments into works of art – the project of transforming them into "perfect moments" – was expressed in literary form by Jean-Paul Sartre in his novel, *Nausea* (1938).

157. In *Ecce Homo*, "Why I am so Clever," §1, Nietzsche states that he "never devoted any attention or time" to concepts such as "redemption" and "God." What he intends to say, since he speaks famously and repeatedly about the concept of "God," for instance, is that these concepts have been "spoiled" by Christianity, and have been perverted in their proper meaning. He made this point explicitly in *The Gay Science*, §335. For a classic statement of Nietzsche's own, alternative, conception of redemption, see *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Book II, "On Redemption."

As early as *Schopenhauer as Educator* (1874), §6, Nietzsche was fundamentally interested in redemption, going so far as to say that "humanity ought to seek out and create the favorable conditions" under which more redemptive people can be brought into existence. If one considers the root meaning of the German word "*Erlösung*" – the word which is translated into English as "redemption" – the clusters of meanings include "to release," "to loosen up," "to cast off" and "to remove." All of which suggest that the quest for redemption is a quest for a kind of freedom, and that Nietzsche is fundamentally interested in attaining a release from various kinds of bondage.

158. In *Ecce Homo*, "Daybreak," §1, he claimed that his "campaign against morality" began at the end of the decade, in his appropriately titled book, *Daybreak* (1880).

159. The term "theodicy" was introduced into philosophical currency by Leibniz, who was referred to above as maintaining that the world we live in is "the best of all possible worlds." Voltaire (1694–1778) memorably satirized this idea in *Candide* (1759).

160. Nietzsche, *The Case of Wagner*, §3.

161. Nietzsche's implicit reference here is to Jesus' story of the prodigal son (here, "the one who had been lost"). See Luke 15:11–32. The suggestion is that one "comes home" to the world as a whole by means of the attitude of life-affirmation described here.

162. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part I, "On the Three Transformations."

163. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," §8.

164. Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, Second Essay, §24.

165. Nietzsche at one point refers to a "thousand-year Zarathustra-Reich" (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part IV, "The Honey Offering"), which conveys associations between Zarathustra, Jesus, and Charlemagne. In terms of future projections, Revelation 20:1–10 refers to the "first resurrection" where it is said that Jesus, at some point in the future, will reign for one thousand years. In terms of past history, Charlemagne was crowned by Pope Leo III on Christmas Day, 800, to initiate the Holy Roman Empire that would last for 1000 years.

166. See Matthew 5:19–22.

167. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part III, "On Old and New Tablets," §10.

168. This interpretation of Eternal Recurrence as the "recurrence of the different" rather than the "recurrence of the same" is offered by Gilles Deleuze in his book, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962). The original thought is from Georg Simmel (*Schopenhauer and Nietzsche* [1907]), who, as a critique of Nietzsche's doctrine of the "recurrence of the same," developed a mathematical example that embodied the continual occurrence of unique patterns.

169. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, §33.

170. *The Gay Science*, §290, has an especially detailed account of how one can "give style" to one's character. The aesthetic justification of suffering involves regarding suffering in the correct perspective; to do this, one makes oneself into a sublime character.

171. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I am an Inevitability," §1.

172. Independently of his sister's activities during the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century, Nietzsche's writings were appreciated by a variety of groups that ranged across the political spectrum. See Steven Aschheim's *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890–1990* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992).

173. Nietzsche, *The Case of Wagner*, §5.

174. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I am so Clever," §1.

175. *Ibid.*, §5.

176. *Ibid.*, "The Case of Wagner," §3.

177. Förster was known during Nietzsche's lifetime as someone who, joined by Nietzsche's sister, attempted to establish an Aryan colony in the remote, and "non-racially polluted," jungles of Paraguay – a colony which they called "*Neua Germania*" (New Germany) – and with which Nietzsche wanted no connection whatsoever. For the details of this colony's development and demise, see Ben MacIntyre's, *Forgotten Fatherland – In Search of Elisabeth Nietzsche* (New York: Harper/Perennial, 1993). Wagner's anti-Semitism is attested by his own writings.
178. Chamberlain, Wagner, and Hitler were all influenced by Joseph Arthur Gobineau's mid-nineteenth-century book, *The Inequality of Human Races* (1853–55) – a work which argued that the "Aryan" peoples were racially superior to all others. Gobineau claimed that it was essential to preserve a civilization's racial character, and that intermixture between different groups should be minimized, lest the vitality of the civilization be diluted and undermined. From such typical claims issue the alleged connection between social health and the maintenance of racial purity. Gobineau's book, however, only reinforced Richard Wagner's already-existing anti-Semitism. Wagner's essay, "Judaism in Music," was written in 1850 (and first published under a pseudonym) – at a time, it is worth adding, long before Nietzsche met him.
179. See Geoffrey George Field, *Houston Stewart Chamberlain: Prophet of Bayreuth* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University, 1972), pp. 102–104.
180. In January 1888, immediately after his collapse, he wrote a letter to Cosima Wagner which read, "Ariadne, I love you."
181. For example, Nietzsche's critical remarks often focus on a specific Jewish group (e.g., the Pharisees, whom he likens to "tarantulas"), rather than on the Jewish people as a whole.
182. See, for example, *Mein Kampf* Volume II, Chapter 17.
183. Hitler also used arguments that might have come directly from Nietzsche. For example, he referred to "the Jewish teachings of Marxism" which "reject the aristocratic principle of nature and put in place of the eternal prerogative of force and strength, the mass of numbers and their dead weight." *Mein Kampf*, Volume I, Chapter 2. See, in comparison, Nietzsche's notebook entry from March–June 1888 (§53), which is almost identical in wording, although it is aimed at a different subject. I thank Geoffrey Roche for the discussion that directed me to this passage.
184. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, §38.
185. Hitler comparably used the word "parasite" [*Parasit*], to refer to the Jewish people (*Mein Kampf*, Volume I, Chapter 11, "Nation and Race").
186. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, §42.
187. *Ibid.*, §43.
188. *Ibid.*, §46.
189. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, §40.
190. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part III, "On the Virtue that Makes One Small," §3.
191. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Third Essay, §21.
192. Hitler stated that he was addressing a "spiritual pestilence, worse than the Black Death of times past" (*Mein Kampf*, Volume I, Chapter 2, "Years of Study and Suffering in Vienna").
193. The idea of having to "wash oneself clean with contaminated water" reveals a more general philosophical condition. One might ask, for instance, how it is possible to arrive at a universally-valid view if the language one inherits is filled with the limiting prejudices and valuations of one's specific historical time period or specific culture. Similarly, one can ask how it is possible to express a non-sexist viewpoint if the language one inherits is itself permeated with sexism.
194. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part II, "On Human Cleverness."
195. *Ibid.*, "Zarathustra's Prologue," §3.
196. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, "What is Distinguished," §260.
197. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Third Essay, §16.
198. Nietzsche made this comparison between himself (as "Zarathustra") and the Jewish people. See *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part IV, "The Shadow." It goes along with his many references to himself as a "wanderer."
199. Nietzsche, *Ecc Homo*, "Why I am so Clever," §3.
200. The title of Nietzsche's *The Gay Science* was inspired by the twelfth-century, southern Provence troubadours.
201. More generally speaking, there is also a more distant connection – via the idea of decapitation – to the Medusa image that appears in Nietzsche's writings.
202. On some accounts of the Medusa myth, moreover, Perseus turns Medusa into stone by leading her to behold her own reflection. Sartre's theory of consciousness is strangely parallel with this idea. According to him, to think explicitly about anything, requires that one hold it fast before one's consciousness and therefore objectify it (i.e., turn it into "stone"). So when one explicitly thinks about oneself (or about anything else), one must negate the living activity of oneself-as-thinker by turning oneself an object of thought (i.e., turn oneself into "stone"). Sartre's theory of consciousness, in effect, turns us all into Medusas.

203. See the subsection of the first chapter of Camus's *The Myth of Sisyphus*, "Absurd Walls."
204. Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human*, "On First and Last Things," \$2.
205. Epicurus, the Roman Stoic philosopher, captured this sentiment well, for he urged us to remember that when we grow fond of something, the nature of the thing we are fond of should always be kept in mind. If we fall in love with a perishable being, such as a person, we must be prepared for the day when the person will die. See Epicurus, *Handbook*, \$3.
206. Nietzsche's projection of the coming of the "superhuman" can be understood as a residual artifact of his prevailing nineteenth-century context. In other parts of his philosophy, as we have seen, Nietzsche observes only the continual recycling of the world's contents, which he believes do not aim towards any special end.
207. Nietzsche, Lectures on the Pre-Platonic Philosophers, "\$10, Heraclitus."
208. If, however, one subjects the very idea of "health" to a genealogical-historical analysis, noting that different societies have had different conceptions of health, then one can challenge the foundational idea of "health" within the Nietzschean position itself.
209. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Book One, "On the Thousand and One Goals," Nietzsche states that the meaning of "human" is "*der Schätzende*" (the appraiser; the esteem; the valuer; the evaluator; the assessor; the appreciator).
210. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Why I am an Inevitability," \$4.
211. *Ibid.*, \$2.
212. Eris is the Greek goddess of discord.
213. Shiva is the Vedic god of destruction.

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